Case Notes by Mueller, Karen J. et al.
LANDLORD-TENANT-THE FALL OF LANDLORD TORT IMMUNITY-Sd,'-
gent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528 (1973).
I. INTRODUCTION
A landlord is generally not liable' for injuries incurred as a result of unrea-
sonably dangerous conditions existing on property which he has leased to another.2
However, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in Sargent v. Ross,8 placed
that state in direct conflict with the vast weight of American authority4 by reject.
ing this doctrine of landlord tort immunity.
In Sargent, plaintiff's four-year old daughter died as a result of a fall from
an outdoor stairway while being cared for at her regular baby-sitter's apartment.
Plaintiff's damage suit was brought against the baby-sitter (tenant) for negligent
supervision, and against the landlord for negligent construction and maintenance
of the stairway. The evidence indicated that the stairway was dangerously steep
and that the railing was insufficient to prevent the fall. The primary issue in
the case was, therefore, whether the landlord was immune from liability or
whether the facts of the case constituted one of the exceptions to the rule of
landlord tort immunity.5 The landlord's defense of immunity was based on the
fact that the stairway serviced only the tenant's apartment and therefore was
not a passageway used in common with other tenants. This being the case,
there was no implication that the landlord retained control over the stairway,
and thus no reason why the doctrine of landlord immunity should not attach.0
The court rejected the landlord's argument. Admitting that it "could strain
[the] test to the limits and find control in the landlord," 7 but not being "in-
clined to so expand the fiction,"8 the court chose instead to abrogate the doctrine
of landlord tort immunity. The rejection of the doctrine was unequivocal: "We
think that now is the time for the landlord's limited tort immunity to be relegated
to the history books where it more properly belongs." 9
The repudiation of landlord tort immunity necessitates the promulgation of
a new standard with which the conduct of a landlord should be judged. The
Sargent court, in choosing an alternative standard of care, decided there was
1 There are several exceptions to this doctrine of tort immunity whereby the landlord will
be subject to tort liability. The landlord is liable if: (1) there are undisclosed or hldden dan-
gers known only to the landlord, (2) the land is leased for public use, (3) the particular area
was a common area of which the landlord maintained control, (4) the landlord has made the
land dangerous through negligent repairs, 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, §§
27.16, 27.17 (1956); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 63 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMINT (SEICOND) Ol
TORTS, §§ 358-62 (1965). About half the state courts have also held that liability exists
when a landlord fails to perform in accordance with an express agreement to repair. W.
PROSSER, TORTS § 63, at 408-10 (4th ed. 1971).
2 2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 5 234 (rev. ed. 1973); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 63 (4th
ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 358-62 (1965).
3 308 A.2d 528 (1973).
4 See authorities cited in note 2 supra.
• 308 A.2d at 530.
02 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 5 234 (rev. ed. 1973); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 63 (4th
ed. 1971); Annor., 25 A.L.R.2d 364, 366 (1952).
7 308 A.2d at 532.
8 d.
9 Id. at 533.
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no longer any justification for limiting landlord liability: "Henceforth, landlords
as other persons must exercise reasonable care not to subject others to an unreason-
able risk of harm."' 0 The court thus put the landlord on an equal footing
with all other persons by charging him with the standard of care required by
the general law of negligence.
Moreover, although Sargent involved the liability of a landlord to a third
party, there appears to be no distinction between the duty owed to tenants vis-
a-vis the duty owed to third parties. The landlord's new duty is to exercise
reasonable care to reduce the likelihood of personal injuries, whether incurred
by a tenant or a third party, from defects on property."
This case note examines the considerations which were responsible for the
abrogation of the doctrine of landlord tort immunity. The tort rationale explicit-
ly set forth in Sargent v. Ross entirely justifies the rejection of the immunity,
but there are also independent considerations, not completely delineated by the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire, which strongly support the Sargent holding.
Therefore, the discussion will first focus on the explicit arguments put forward
by the court in Sargent and then analyze other underlying justifications for the
decision. The scope of the discussion is limited, however, to the issues surround-
ing the liability of a landlord who leases residential units.12
II. THE RATIONALE OF SARGENT
The Sargent court recognized that the general principles of tort law impose
liability upon persons who have caused injuries by their failure to act reasonably
under the circumstances,' 3 and that the central issue in any tort case is whether
or not the alleged tortfeasor has acted reasonably. However, in the case of a land-
lord, the only way to establish liability was to fit the facts into one of the excep-
tions to the rule of landlord to t immunity. Emphasis on the exceptions to the rule
of landlord immunity diverted the jury's attention from the central issue whether
the landlord had acted unreasonably.14 Therefore, in order to charge the landlord
with the standard of care.of the general law of negligence, the court believed
it was necessary to abolish the doctrine of landlord immunity.
The court postulated three main justifications for abolishing the immunity:
(A) the concept of tort immunity is deteriorating; (B) the historical basis for
the doctrine of landlord immunity is now irrelevant and obsolete; (C) the recogni-
tion of a warranty of habitability in a lease transaction discards the doctrine
of caveat emptor.
A. The Concept of Tort Immunity Is Deteriorating
Sargent is in accord with the general proposition that no one should be im-
mune from the foreseeable cbnsequences of his actions. Immunity is a dying
101d. at 534.
"I1d. at 535.
1 2 The purpose of confining the discussion to residential units is to exclude any considera-
tion of commercial leases.
13 308 A.2d at 530.
14 Id. at 533.
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concept.' 5 Charities, governments, parents and spouses have all seen their respec-
tive tort immunities substantially diminished in recent years. As one court has
observed:
The law's emphasis ordinarily is on liability, not immunity, for
wrongdoing. . . . The rule of immunity itself has given way gradually
but steadily through widening, though not too well or consistently rea-
soned modifications. It is disintegrating. . . . As more and more steps
are taken, correction becomes more complete. The process is nearing the
end. This leaves the steps untaken standing out as the more anoma-
lous.' o
The Sargent court was quick to recognize the anomalous result which would
have arisen from an application of the doctrine of landlord tort immunity. The
tenants argued that it was unreasonable to impose upon them the duty of repair-
ing a major structural defect.17 The landlord, however, denied liability "because
the stairs were not under her control."' 8 Both tenant and landlord thus claimed
the other party should be responsible, and the doctrine of landlord tort immunity
supported both arguments. As a result, the plaintiff faced the dilemma of an
intolerable rule which left "neither landlord nor tenant responsible for dangerous
conditions on the premises.""'
Since the plaintiff's claim arose from the construction of the stairway at a
dangerously steep pitch,2 a major alteration of the property was needed to allevi-
ate the defect. Tenants generally possess neither the finances nor a sufficient
long-term property interest to justify expenditures for substantial alterations. lRe-
lying on Kline v. Burns,2 1 the Sargent court held that "ordinarily the landlord
is best able to remedy dangerous conditions, particularly when a substantial alter-
ation is required."22  But the landlord is encouraged to remain idle by the doc-
trine of landlord tort immunity. Any attempt to repair might serve as evidence
of his control,2 3 while repairs actually made might only increase his exposure
to liability if such repairs are negligently undertaken.2-  Therefore, if the tenant
is under no duty to make substantial repairs, failure to impose liability on tie
landlord leaves the injured party with no remedy. The court indicated that the
landlord's position in society should not be held so sacrosanct as to guarantee
him freedom from liability. On the contrary, "[c]onsiderations of human safety
within an urban community dictate that the landowner's relative immunity . . .
be modified in favor of negligence principles of landowner liability."2a In a
legal system which seeks to compensate injured parties for the harm they have
15 See W. PROSSER, TORTS §§ 131-35 (4th ed. 1971).
'
0 President and Dir. of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 827 (D.C. Cir.
1942).




21 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971).
22 308 A.2d at 532.
2 3 Id.
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 362 (1965).
25 25 VAND. L. REv. 623, 640 (1972).
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suffered, there is no place for a doctrine which would immunize landlords from
liability. All tortfeasors must shoulder the responsibility for the foreseeable conse-
quences of their actions.
B. The Historical Basis for the Doctrine of Landlord Immunity Is Now
Irrelevant and Obsolete
The common law recognized the lease as a conveyance of an estate in land.
As the holder of an estate, the tenant was entitled to the exclusive use and
possession of the land. The landlord, having consigned the estate to the tenant,
was devoid of any rights respecting the premises for the duration of the term
of the lease. As a result of this conveyance, the landlord was entitled to rent.
The primary object of the transaction was the land itself, for it was from the
carth that the tenant would generally grow the crops which produced the income
to pay the rent. It was "the fields, orchards, pastures and streams and their
possession" 2 6 that concerned the parties. Since cultivation of the fields was gener-
ally the contemplation of the parties, buildings and other improvements were
normally incidental to the agreement.2 7
Inherent in the tenant's right to the exclusive use and possession of the land
was the landlord's lack of any right to re-enter. Absent a power of re-entry,
the landlord was under no obligation to look after the leased premises.28 There-
fore, under the common law the general rule was that, absent an agreement
to the contrary, a landlord was under no duty to repair. As the concept of
tort liability began to develop, it was easy for the courts to formulate another
general rule exempting landlords from liability for injuries caused by defective or
dangerous conditions on the leased premises. A landlord who had no power to en-
ter and repair certainly had no liability for the injurious results of unmade repairs.
Such a responsibility could better be shouldered by the tenant in possession, who
was charged with the upkeep of the premises. As a result, the common law courts
developed the doctrine of landlord tort.immunity. The reasoning of the courts was
probably aided by the fact that most landlords were men of considerable wealth
and "[tihe common law judges largely represented the land-owning class." - 9
The concept that a landlord should be immune from tort liability received
authoritative support from the doctrine of careat emptor. The application of
this "sale of goods" concept to leases purported to put the tenant on notice
that he took possession at his own risk. Therefore, the landlord was under no
duty to deliver the premises in a safe condition because it was the responsibility
of the tenant to determine for himself the condition of the property before
entering into the lease agreement.:30 This rationale left the landlord devoid
of any liability for dangerous conditions existing at the outset of the lease'
26 Quinn and Phillips, The Law Of Landlord Tenant: A Critical Evaluatio, 01 The Pait
With Guidelines For The Future, 38 FORDHAm L. REv. 225, 227 (1969).
27 Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 91,276 A.2d 248,250 (1971).
28W_ PROSSER, TORTS § 63 at 400 (4th ed. 1971 ); 62 HARV. L REv. 669 (1949).
29 Harkrider, Tort Liability Of A Landlord, 26 MICH. L REV. 260, 261 (1928).
'30 62 HARV. L REv. 669 (1949).
:1 W. PROSSER, TORTS § 63 at 400 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
§ 356, Comment (a), (1965). Although the Restatement sets out the general rule of land-
lord immunity, there is no mention of cateat emptor as the origin of the rule.
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because the tenant took "the premises as he [found] them, for better or for
worse." .12  In the graphic terms of one English jurist, "there is no law against
letting a tumbledown house."' :1
Thus the doctrine of landlord immunity, as originally developed, represented
a total exemption from liability. The landlord was immune from liability for
injuries resulting from lack of repairs made subsequent to the lease,"' and liability
for defects existing prior to the lease was imposed upon the tenant through the
doctrine of caveat emptor"3 5
Contrary to appearance, this arrangement was not unusually burdensome to
the tenant. He had bargained for the use of the land and that is exactly what
he obtained. All other considerations were secondary to his right to till the
fields:
It all made sense back in those' days with the landlord off on the
hunt or drinking port in the quiet of the evening, and the tenant asking
only to be left alone to tend his fences and to shear his sheep, The
heart of the system was land and its possession. The model landlord
was the one who did the least. The tenant in turn was expected to run
the farm, to be the omnicompetent man fully prepared to see to his own
own shelter, heat and light.3
A tenant in a feudal, agrarian economy was not unduly prejudiced by the arrange.
ment as he was considered "capable of maintaining the premises with little diffi-
culty." 37 The buildings were easy to repair, being simply constructed and devoid
of modern structural complexities. Moreover, the buildings were merely inciden-
tal to the core of the arrangement; what the parties had bargained for was the
use of the land itself.
Although landlord tort immunity was the product of a rural agrarian economy,
the social conditions which surrounded the creation of the immunity were not
resistant to change. The momentous societal transformation of the industrial
revolution fostered the decline of agrarianism and the rise of the urban, industrial
economy. The law, however, was more resistant to change, and as a result a
problem arose: the agrarian law of leases slowly became unsuitable to industrial
man. "The social changes in England and the United States since the eighteenth
century, taken altogether, have made the presumptions of agrarian landlord-tenant
law singularly inappropriate." 38  Generally speaking, the modern tenant is no
longer interested in large amounts of land. Working the land is no longer
3 2 Harkrider, Tort Liability Of A Landlord, 26 MICH. L. REV. 260, 262 (1928).
33 Robbins v. Jones, 15 C.B.N.S.221, 240; 143 Eng. Rep. 768, 776 (1863).
3 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 355 (1965).
3 5 See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 27.16 at 1510 (1956). I-Inrper
and James do not use the term caveat emptor, but instead talk of the tenant's assumption of
risk. The doctrine that the tenant has assumed the risk that the premises are safe is the basic
premise of caveat emptor. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 356 (1965).
36 Quinn and Phillips, The Law Of Landlord Tenant: A Critical Evaluation O The Pait
With Guidelints For The Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225, 231 (1969).
37 59 GEO. LJ. 1153, 1156 (1971).
3 8 J. LEvr, P. HABLUTZEL, I. ROSENBERG & J. WHITE, MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD,
TENANT CODE 6 (tent. draft 1969).
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the source of income to pay the rent.3 9 The modern tenant, earning his income
in an industrial economy, is interested instead in adequate living conditions to
house his family. "He [does] not share the farmer's interest in being left alone
to work the fields. Indeed there [are] no fields." 40  His interest is focused
on a building, often an apartment in a multi-dwelling unit, and the accompanying
services necessary to provide him with a satisfactory share of shelter and comfort.4'
In short, the leaseholder of a residential unit no longer considers the land to
be the primary object of the transaction. The rise of the industrial community
has transformed the character of a residential lease.
Industrialization also made it increasingly unreasonable for tenants of residen-
tial units to make repairs. The size and complexity of modern residential build-
ings made the tenant incompetent, rather than "omnicompetent," to undertake
repairs.42 Industrialization increased population mobility, resulting in an increas-
ing number of short-term residential leases. The short duration of these leases
would often present a further obstacle to the tenants' ability to repair; they might
find it impossible "to obtain any financing for major repairs since they have
no long-term interest in the property." 43
Despite the changes brought about by industrialization, the tenants' common
law duty to repair, as well as his liability for injuries resulting from defects
in the property, remained intact. Gradually the courts began to have misgivings
about the doctrine of landlord tort immunity as it became increasingly obvious
that in some circumstances the landlord was probably better suited than the tenant
to undertake repairs. 44 The courts recognized that the common law doctrine
was in need of modification, and they began to construct limitations to the rule.
39 The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated that in 1971 only 3.9 percent of the population
could be classified as farm workers. 1973 WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACtS 119.
40 Quinn & Phillips, The Law Of Landlord Tenant: A Critical Evaluation Of The PaNit
With Guidelines For The Future, 38 FORDIHAM L REv. 225, 231 (1969).
41 Id. at 321:
The new type of tenant was anything but self-sufficient and the last thing he
wanted was to be left alone. Since he occupied only a part of the building, he was
dependent on the rest of it. He relied upon the building's water system, lighting
system, and heating system; he was sharing walls, doors, corridors and stairways.
Agrarian self-reliance in this context is simply not possible.
42 It has come to be recognized that ordinarily the lessee does not have as much
knowledge of the condition of the premises as the lessor. Building code require-
ments and violations are known or made known to the lessor, not the lessee. He
is in a better position to know of latent defects, structural and otherwise, in a build-
ing which might go unnoticed by a les.ee who rarely has sufficient knowledge or ex-
pertise to see or to discover them. A prospective lessee ... cnnot be expected to
know if the plumbing or wiring systems are adequate or conform to local codes.
Nor should he be expected to hire experts to advise him. Ordinarily all this infor-
mation should be considered readily available to the lessor who in turn can inform
the prospective lessee.
Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 452, 251 A.2d 268, 272 (1969). The above
passage is also quoted in Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 432-33, 462 P.2d 470, 474 (1969).
Accord, Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Jack
Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 IL2d 351, 364, 280 N.E. 2d 208, 216 (1972); Kline v. Burns,
111 N.H. 87, 92, 276 A.2d 248, 251 (1971); Foisy v. Wyman, 515 P.2d 160, 164 (Wash.
1973).
43 javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
44 See sources cited in note 42 supra.
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They usually did so, however, "by making exceptions to the general rules of
non-liability rather than by adopting a fundamentally different theory as to duties
of a [landlord]."4 -- The law as it stands today is L complex jumble of excep-
tions. 4r0 This present state of the law-limited landlord tort immunity-is what
the Sargent opinion found to be objectionable. Instead of increasing the confu-
sion by establishing another exception, Sargent adopted a "fundamentally different
theory" of the duty of a landlord by abolishing the doctrine of landlord tort im-*
munity.
The cornerstone of the doctrine of landlord tort immunity was the fact that
the lease agreement was actually a conveyance of property which transferred con-
trol over the land from landlord to tenant. Sargent recognized that the original
justification for the doctrine has eroded with the disappearance of an agrarian
society. The rule is an historical anachronism. When the social conditions sup-
porting a rule of law undergo a substantial change, the dictates of justice demand
that the rule as well be subjected to re-evaluation. The doctrine of landlord tort
immunity is just as obsolete as the agrarian community whence it evolved,
C. The Recognition of a lWarranty of Habitability in a Lere Transiaction
Discards the Doctrine of Caveat Emptor
.New Hampshire was among the vanguard of jurisdictions which recognized
a warranty of habitability in a lease transaction.4 7 A warranty of habitability
consigns to the graveyard the theory of caveat emptor as that doctrine related
to leases. If the landlord warrants the premises to be safe for human habitation,
the landlord has also agreed to accept responsibility for the condition of the
premises. That responsibility estabfishes the landlord's duty in tort to maintain
the property in a reasonably safe condition. It is not the tenant who has accepted
the risk but the landlord. As previously discussed, the doctrine of caveat emptor
was one of the bases for the rule of landlord non-liability in tort. Therefore,
the rejection of caveat emptor marks the discarding of "the very legal foundation
and justification for the landlord's immunity in tort: for injuries to the tenant
or third persons." 48
Sargent did not explicitly discuss the warranty of habitability other than to
recognize the warranty as the basis for the rejection of caveat emptor. However,
it is submitted that the existence of a warranty of habitability is the underlying
rationale of the Sargent decision. The duties imposed on a landlord by a war-
ranty of habitability dictate rejection of the rule of non-liability in tort. Jurisdic-
tions which follow the Sargent lead may find the warranty of habitability the
most useful weapon in the arsenal that can be aimed at the doctrine of landlord
tort immunity.
III. OTHER UNDERLYING CONSIDERATIONS IN
SUPPORT OF SARGENT
The decision to charge the landlord with the traditional standard of care
of the general law of negligence can be viewed as a logical extension of the
45 62 HARV. L. REV. 669, 671 (1949).
46 See note 1 supra.
4 7 KIinev.Burns, 111 N.H. 87,276 A.2d 248 (1971).
48 308 A.2d at 534.
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implied warranty of habitability. The full implications of this implied warranty
were not fully discussed by the court in Sargent. This part of the case note,
therefore, suggests some alternative justifications for the result reached in Sargent,
which focus essentially on a warranty theory. The discussion will be predicated
on the following propositions: (A) A residential lease gives rise to an implied
warranty of habitability because such a lease more dosely resembles a contractual
agreement than a property transaction; a breach of that warranty should evoke
remedies for personal injuries. (B) The legislative intent inherent in the housing
codes gives rise to an implied warranty of habitability; a breach of that warranty
should also evoke remedies for personal injuries. (C) The existing housing codes
offer inadequate protection to injured persons; in the absence of an implied war-
ranty of habitability, most jurisdictions have found no statutory duty arising from
the housing codes which will impose liability upon landlords for personal injuries.
A. The Contractual Nature of a Residential Lease Creates a Warranty of
Habitability
The doctrine of landlord tort immunity has its antecedents in real property
law.49 The decision to abolish the doctrine of the immunity may have been
reached earlier were it not for the courts' conceptualization of the lease as basical-
ly a property transaction. The medieval view of a lease as a conveyance of
an estate in land is simply inadequate to meet the needs of residential tenants
who are dependent upon landlords for a large package of services.3°  Modem
residential leases should be recognized as primarily involving the purchase of
shelter together with a variety of services incident to that shelter. Recognition
of the lease as primarily a contractual agreementnt for the purchase of shelter
for a specified period of time should offer the tenant all the protections of the
general law of contracts, particularly protections analogous to the provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code relating to the sale of goods." Among the
protections afforded by the Uniform Commercial Code are implied warranties
of merchantability and fitness. :3 Regarding the landlord as a seller of shelter
presumes an implied warranty on the part of the landlord that the premises
are fit for the intended purpose.t 4 If the premises are unfit, the landlord should
49 See text beginning at note 26 supra.
50 Quinn & Phillips, The Law Of Landlord Tenant: A Critical Evaluation Of The Past
With Guidelines For The Future, 38 FORDHAM L REV. 225, 231 (1969).
51 The civil law regards the lease as a contract. See 2 M. PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE
CIVIL LAW, No. 1663 (1959).
52 It is not contended that the law of landlord-tenant be purged of all real property doc-
trines. A lease represents a unique combination of both contract and property law, and should
be viewed as both a conveyance and contract. It is contended, however, that a residential
tenant is entitled to the same protections offered to a vendee under the law of sales. The im-
plied warranties which are incident to a sales transaction were conceived to prevent unfair
bargaining. The vendor was often in a better position than the vendee to know the condition
and quality of the goods and to distribute the losses which might occur from defects in the
goods. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS § 28.19 (1956). When the same
conditions exist between landlord and tenant, the same protections should be afforded.
53 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314, 2-315 [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.].
54 Some courts have ipplied a warranty of habitability to a residential lease. See text be-
ginning at note 61 infra.
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then be liable for all damages resulting from the breach of the implied warranty
of fitness. Moreover, the Uniform Commercial Code provides a remedy for
personal injuries which result from a breach of warranty.r If a lease transaction
is viewed as analogous to a sale of goods, a remedy should also be available
for personal injuries which result from a landlord's breach of the implied warranty
of habitability.
One of the basic tenets of modern contract law is that "the buyer of goods
and services in an industrialized society must rely upon the skill and honesty
of the supplier to assure that goods and services purchased are of adequate qual-
ity."i6o This reliance on the part of the buyer is the source of a warranty on
the part of the seller that the goods are fit and merchantable5 7  Residential
tenants are often forced to rely on the skill and honesty of their landlords to
assure that the premises are of sufficient quality. In fact their reliance may be
even greater than that involved in the sale of goods. The inequality of bargain-
ing power between landlords and tenants, the tenants' lack of leverage to demand
better housing, racial and class discrimination, the standardized lease form, and,
the shortage of adequate urban housing all combine to increase the urban tenants'
dependence on their landlords. "8
Although the doctrine of implied warranty originated in the law of sales,
warranty protection should not be denied in analogous situations when the same
considerations arise. .9  In transactions for the lease of goods in which the con-
sumer has been forced to rely on the skill and honesty of the supplier to the
same extent as would a purchaser of goods, courts have been willing to imply
similar warranties of quality.00  If warranty protection is incident to the lease
of goods, the protection could be extended to the lease of housing. Considering
the residential tenant's reliance upon his landlord and the inappropriateness of
antiquated rules of property law to govern the modern lease transaction, the
tenant should be afforded the full protection offered by the implied warranties
of fitness.
Thus construing a lease as basically contractual in nature, some jurisdictions
have recently recognized an implied warranty of habitability as an integral part
of a lease transaction. 61 The warranty of habitability creates an obligation on
the part of the landlord to provide premises which are free of defects and fit
for habitation at the inception of the lease.02 Defects which existed at the time
55 U.C.C. § 2-715 (2)(b).
56 Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cit. 1970).
5 'U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315.
58 See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
.59 See note 52 supra.
60 Eg., Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing and Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769
(1965).
61 Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert, donied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d '170, 40 A.L.R. 3d 637 (1969);
Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill.2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1912); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H,
87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A,2d 526 (1970); Reste
Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969); Foisy v. Wyman, 515 P.2d
160 (Wa.h. 1973).
02 Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 433, 462 P.2d 470, 474, 40 A.L.R.3d 637 (1969);
Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 92, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (1971); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J.
130, 144, 265 A.2d 526, 533 (1970).
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the lease was entered into, and which rendered the premises unfit for habitation,
would constitute a breach of the implied warranty of habitability.a" There is
a question, however, whether or not defects which arise after the lease was entered
into would constitute a breach of warranty. At least two cases have suggested
that as the tenants continue to pay the rent, they are entitled to expect that
the landlord will continue to maintain the premises in a habitable condition. 61
Such a construction charges the landlord with an obligation to make the repairs
necessary to maintain the premises in the same condition as at the inception
of the lease. In other words, the landlord must make the repairs necessary to
keep the premises fit for the purposes for which they were intended. Failure
to do so would be a breach of warranty. "Adoption of this view makes available
to the tenant the basic contract remedies of damages, reformation and rescis-
sion."O These remedies for the breach of a warranty of habitability closely
parallel the remedies provided by the Uniform Commercial Code for the breach
of an implied warranty in the sale of goods66 Extending the analogy, it follows
that since the Uniform Commercial Code provides that any person injured as
a result of a breach of warranty may recover damages,3 damages for personal
injury should also flow from a landlord's breach of a warranty of habitability. The
recovery should not be limited by the fact that the landlord and the injured party
were not in privity with each other.08
Reliance upon the contractual nature of a lease as the source of the warranty
of habitability is not without its problems. When dealing with the doctrines
of contract law, notice must be taken of the intent of the parties. A purchaser
who buys goods "as is" or with full knowledge of the defects does not have
the benefit of warranty protection.6 9 Similarly, a tenant who was aware of defects
on the premises may have been willing to accept the premises despite the defects,
especially if he was able to negotiate lower rent payments.70 In such a case,
the tenant likewise should be removed from the scope of warranty protection.
63The defect of Sargent appears to have existed at the inception of the lease. The dan-
gerously steep nature of the stairway was a major structural defect which had existed since the
construction of the stairs.
G,4 Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1970):
We point out that in the present cases there is no allegation that [the] apartments
were in poor condition or in violation of the housing code at the commencement of
the leases. Since the lessees continue to pay the same rent, they were entitled to ex-
pect that the landlord would continue to keep the premises in their beginning con-
dition during the lease term.
Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87,92, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (1971):
This means that at the inception of the rental there are no latent defects in facilities
vital to the use of the premises for residential purposes and that these essential facil-
ities will remain during the entire term in a condition which makes the property liv-
able.
0 Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. at 93, 276 A.2d at 252.
66 U.C.C. § 2-711.
67 U.C.C. § 2-715 (2)(b).
08u.c.c. § 2-318.
69 U.C.C. § 2-316 (3).
70 The dissenters in Foisy v. lVyman argued that the tenant had agreed to accept the
premises with the existing defects:
From [the] testimony it is perfectly clear that the [tenant] was fully aware of the
1974]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
However, there arc many instances in which the tenant's "agreement" to accept
defects and poor conditions is a sham. The landlord will often possess superior
bargaining power. If that bargaining power is used unfairly, the tenant should
not be held to the objectionable conditions and terms of the lease. In transactions
for the sale of goods, an unfair "agreement" may render the contract unenforceable
under the Uniform Commercial Code's section on "unconscionability." t  The
doctrine of unconscionability could easily be applied to lease transactions, A
recent case illustrates:
It can be argued, however, that the [tenant] should not be entitled
to the protection of an implied warranty of habitability since he knew
of a substantial number of defects when he rented the premises and tile
rent was reduced .. . We believe this type of bargaining by the land.
lord with the tenant is contrary to public policy and the purpose of the
doctrine of implied warranty of habitability. A disadvantaged tenant
should not be placed in a position of agreeing to live in an uninhabit-
able premises [sic]. Housing conditions, such as the record indicates
exist in the instant case, are a health hazard, not only to the individual
tenant, but to the community which is exposed to said individual. 72
B. The Legislative Intent Inherent In The Housing Codes Gives Rise to a
Warranty of Habitability
The initial cases which recognized a warranty of habitability in a residential
lease put emphasis on the contractual nature of such a lease.78  Later cases, how-
ever, have found it unnecessary to dwell on the contractual nature of a residential
lease; 74 the most recent decision appears to assume the contractual nature of the
transaction. 7 , The thesis of many recent decisions has been that the existence of
a warranty of habitability rests on considerations of public policy as manifested by
housing codes.
A plethora of legislation has imposed new obligations upon property owners
requiring the maintenance of the property in a safe condition. Such legislative
action has obviated the common law rules of the landlord-tenant relationship,
This legislative awareness of the need for tenant protection has served as the
foundation for the imposition of an implied warranty of habitability:
Legislation and administrative rules, . . . building codes, and health
regulations, all impose certain duties on a property owner with respect to
defects and deficiencies in the premises. Those defects and deficiencies were the
very reason he was willing and able to negotiate lower payments.
It requires no authority to sustain the proposition that a person who takes pos-
session of premises with known defects, intends to repair those defects, bargains for
reduced monthly payments and characterizes the transaction as a "deal" which he
"grabbed," neither deserves nor needs the protection of an implied warranty of hab-
itability.
Foisy v. Wyman, 515 P.2d 1(0, 169 (Wash. 1973) (dissenting opinion).
71 U.C.C. § 2-302.
72 Foisy v. Wyman, 515 P.2d 160, 164 (1973).
73 E.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
74 See, e.g., Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971).
V1In Foisy v. Wyman, 515 P.2d 160, 164 (Wash. 1973), reference is made to "all con-
tracts for the renting of premises."
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the condition of his premises. Thus, the legislature has made a policy
judgment-that it is socially (and politically) desirable to impose these
duties on a property owner-which has rendered the old common-law
rule obsolete. To follow the old rule of no implied warranty of habit-
ability in leases would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with the current
legislative policy concerning housing standards. The need and social de-
sirability of adequate housing for people in this era of rapid population
increases is too important to be rebuffed by that obnoxious legal clich,
caveat emptor. Permitting landlords to rent "tumble-down" houses is
at least a contributing cause of such problems as urban blight, juvenile
delinquency, and high property taxes for conscientious landowners.7"
The use of the housing code as the source of the warranty of habitability
appears to offer greater protection to tenants than the "lease as a contract" theory.
The enforcement of housing codes "has been far from uniformly effective."---
The imposition of an implied warranty can inject new vitality into a housing
code by establishing the landlord's duty to repair as co-extensive with the mini-
mum standard set forth in the code.78 In this manner a breach of the warranty
of habitability occurs when there is a significant violation of the housing code.7"
Whether the defect arose before the inception of the lease or after the tenant
took possession would be irrelevant.80
The most serious problem created by regarding the contractual nature of a
lease as the source of a warranty of habitability is that the parties may intentional-
ly waive warranty protection.8 ' Although such a waiver might be found to be
unconscionable, the possibility remains that a court might decide that the tenant
has bargained away his right to warranty protection. No such problems arise
with a warranty derived from legislative intent. The duties imposed by the war-
ranty of habitability may not be "waived or shifted by agreement if the [housing
code] specifically places the duty upon the [landlord]." 82
Where an implied warranty of habitability exists, regardless of the source,
the landlord bears responsibility for the repairs to maintain the property in a
safe condition. Such a warranty to make necessary repairs is totally inconsistent
with the idea that a landlord is immune from tort liability for injuries resulting
from a failure to make necessary repairs. On the contrary, a warranty to repair
creates a legal duty to repair, and a breach of this duty should serve as the
7GPines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 595-96, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412-13 (1961). This
passage from Pines is quoted in Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d at 1082; Marini
v. Ireland, 56 N.J. at 142, 265 A.2d at 532; Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. at 454,
251 A.2d at 273; Foisy v. Wyman, 515 P.2d at 163.
77 Javins v. First Nat'I Realty Corp., 428 F.2d at 1082. See text beginning at note 90
infra.
78Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d at 1082; Jack Spring, Inc. v. little, 50
Ill.2d at 366,280 N.E.2d at 217.
79 Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d at 1082. Sargent made no mention of a
housing code, but in New Hampshire a breach of the warranty of habitability occurs when a
defect exists which will render the premises unsafe. Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. at 93, 276
A.2d at 252.
8o Regarding the housing code as the source of the warranty of habitability would there-
fore eliminate the prob'ems discussed in the text beginning at note 62 suprd.
81 See text beginning at note 69 supra.
82 Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d at 1081-82.
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basis of tort liability. In this manner a warranty of habitability would not only
provide a contractual remedy for personal injuries, but would provide the basis
for imposing tort liability as well. The Sargent decision points out this facty3
Therefore, it was appropriate for the landlord to "bear the cost of repairs necessary
to make the premises safe."84  Having failed to make such repairs, the landlord
had failed to exercise due care under the circumstances and "the jury could find
that the [landlord] was negligent in, the design or construction of the steep
stairway or in failing to take adequate precautionary measures to reduce the risk
of injury."s 5 Regardless whether one adopts a contract or tort theory of recovery,
an implied warranty of habitability imposes liability on the landlord. Contractual
liability arises from the breach of warranty. Tort liability arises from the breach
of the duty to repair, the duty having originated with the implied warranty of
habitability.
In the process of updating the law governing the landlord-tenant relationship,
the courts have frequently focused on the needs of tenants in large multi.dwelling
units.86  It is interesting to note that multi-dwelling units existed throughout
the expanse of common law England. "It is significant that the only numerous
multiple dwellings known to common law-inns, and later rooming houses-
were governed by a law quite unlike thht relating to leases." 87  The innkeeper
enjoyed no immunity from tort liability. The courts were slow to recognize
the similarities between innkeepers and modern apartment landlords, but recent
decisions have made the comparison.88 "[I]t is the innkeeper and not the agrar-
ian landlord who approximates the modern landlord; it is the guest and not
the farmer-tenant who resembles the urban tenant.'"'8 Recognition of the inn-
keeper analogy, although long overdue, coincides with the proposition that a land-
lord has a duty to deliver a habitable dwelling to his tenant.
C. The Existing Housing Codes Offer Inadequate Protection to Injured
Persons
The Sargent decision made no mention of any local statute or ordinance which
required the landlord to maintain the premises in good condition. But many
jurisdictions, recognizing a need for some change in the law governing the duties
of a landlord, have passed such statutes requiring the landlord to maintain and
repair leased property.9 O It could be argued that the landlord's failure to comply
with the statute constitutes negligence per se. As indicated above such a statute
may also serve as the basis of an implied warranty of habitability,91 thereby
83 New Hampshire was among the vanguard of jurisdictions which recognized a warranty
of habitability in a lease agreement. Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A,2d 248 (1971).
84 Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d at 535, quoting Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. at 92, 276 A,2d
at 251.
85Id. at 535.
86 E.g. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d at 1078.
87 MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE, 6 (rent, draft 1969).
88 Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 482 (DC, Cir.
1970); Clarke v. O'Connor 435 F.2d 104, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Javins v. First Nat'l Realty
Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 n. 33 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
89 59 GEo. L.J. 1153, 1168 (1971).
90 2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 3 233 (rev. ed. 1973).
91 See sources cited in note 76 supra.
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imposing contractual liability upon the landlord should the warranty be breached.
Therefore, any consideration of the landlord's tort liability must be viewed in
light of what duties, if any, are imposed on the landlord by local housing codes.
The statutes are generally of three types. The first type contains provisions
stating in general terms that the landlord is under a duty to keep the premises
in good repair.92 Most states with statutes of this type have held the landlord
liable in tort for a breach of the statutory duty.93 However, not all jurisdictions
have so held,9 4 and a statute of this type may be judically interpreted so as
not to impose tort liability on the landlord.
The second type of statute requires the landlord to maintain the premises
in good condition and, upon his failure to do so, allows the tenant to either
make the repairs and deduct the cost from the rent or to vacate the premises
with no further liability for rent.95 Jurisdictions with this type of statute have
usually refused to impose a statutory duty in tort upon the landlord. Instead,
they tend to regard the legislative provisions as exclusive and consider the tenant's
remedies limited to those provided by the statute.90
The third type of statute requires the landlord to maintain the premises in
good condition and "expressly provide[s] for recovery in tort by those persons
injured on the leased premises."9 7  This type of statute presents few problems
of interpretation for the courts. The legislature has expressly abrogated the com-
mon law rule and extended tort liability to landlords.9 8 The express imposition
of tort liability on landlords by such legislation offers the protection necessary
to safeguard parties injured as a result of the landlord's lease of unsafe premises.
92 E.g., N.Y. MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW § 78 (McKinney 1946) Repairs. "Every multi-
ple dwelling, including its roof or roofs, and every part thereof and the lot upon which it is
situated, shall be kept in good repair. The owner shall be responsible for compliance with the
provisions of this section...."
93 Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 704, 708 (1951).
94Id. at 711-12.
95 E.g., Cal. Civil Code §§ 1941, 1942(a) (West Supp. 1973).
§ 1941. Buildings for human occupancy; fitness; repairs.
The lessor of a building intended for the occupation of human beings must, in
the absence of an agreement to the contrary, put it into a condition fit for such oc-
cupation, and repair all subsequent dilapidations thereof, which render it untenant-
able....
§ 1942. Repairs by lessee; rent deduction; limit.
(a) If within a reasonable time after notice to the lessor, of dilapidations which
he ought to repair, he neglects to do so, the lessee may repair the same himself,
where the cost of such repairs does not require an expenditure greater than one
month's rent of the premises, and deduct the expenses of such repairs from the rent,
or the lessee may vacate the premises, in which case he shall be discharged from fur-
ther payment of rent, or performance of other conditions. This remedy shall not
be available to the lessee more than once in any 12-month period.
96 Annot, 17 A.L.R.2d 704, 721 (1951).
97 62 HARV. L REv. 669, 675 (1949).
98 E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 61-112 (1966).
Liability of landlord for negligence of tenant and for failure to repair.
The landlord, having fully parted with possession and right of possession, is not
responsible to third persons for damages resulting from the negligence or illegal use
of the premises by the tenant; but he is responsible to others for damages arising
from defective construction or for damages from failure to keep the premises in re-
pair.
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Unfortunately, most states have enacted statutes which contain no express in-
tention of the legislature to impose tort liability upon the landlord. The vast
majority of the states have passed statutes of the first arid second types,00 and
only a small number of those jurisdictions have held that such statutes are implicit-
ly intended to impose tort liability on the landlord. 10" The housing codes purport
to protect the poor and disadvantaged from exploitation by economically powerful
landlords. It is a hollow protection which leaves the tenant open to suit for
injuries to third parties incurred on the premises its a result of the landlord's
leasing of an unsafe tenement. It is an even stranger protection when the tenants
themselves receive no compensation for injuries they may receive as the result
of dangerous conditions on the premises. But, in fact, most of these statutes
impose no tort liability on the landlord even when the injuries are the direct
result of the landlord's non-compliance with the statute.
Even when the courts have imposed tort liability based on housing codes,
landlords have developed numerous methods for circumventing the statutes, For
instance, a clause in the lease shifting the burden of making repairs from the
landlord to the tenant may obviate the statutory duty. And the presence' of
exculpatory clauses in the lease has been interpreted to release the landlord from
any liability.' 0' It is easy to see that a shrewd landlord can generally avoid
tort liability even when such liability may result ts a function of a statutory
duty.
Considering the ineffectiveness of most statutory remedies, there is need for
more adequate protections. Some courts have put teeth into the housing codes
of their jurisdictions by recognizing an implied warranty of habitability in an
apartment lease.102 New Hampshire was among those jurisdictions which recog-
nized the existence of such a warranty. 1°3 The Sargent court made the ineluctable
extension of the warranty of habitability by abolishing the landlord's tort immu-
nity.
Sargent, then, illustrates the proposition advanced earlier in this discussion
that the abolition of landlord tort immunity is the logical extension of the implied
warranty of habitability in a lease transaction. In order for other jurisdictions
to adopt the Sargent rule, they may first have to recognize a warranty of habitabil-
ity as an integral part of a residential lease. However, considering the contractual
nature of a lease and the legislative intent inherent in the housing codes, the
recognition of such a warranty should present no difficulty.
199 See Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 704 (1951).
100 Tort liability has been found to exist due to a statutory duty in California, Georgia,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Tennessee and Wisconsin. 2 R, POWLL,
REAL PROPERTY 5 23 4 (2)(e) (rev. ed. 1973).
101 Feuerstein & Shestack, Landlord and Tenant--The Statutory Duty To Repair, 45 ILL,
L. REV. 205, 220-25 (1950).
10 2 An implied warranty of habitability can give new vitality to an ineffective housing code
if the standard of conduct used to determine whether there has been a breach of the warranty
is made co-extensive with the landlord's duties set forth in ihe housing code. The warranty
becomes particularly effective when the breach thereof may be raised as an affirmative defense
in an unlawful detainer action. See, e.g., Foisy v. Wyman, 515 P.2d 160 (Wash. 1973).




In repudiating the doctrine of landlord tort immunity, the Sargent court
adopted a new standard with which to judge the conduct of a landlord: the
standard of care required by the general law of negligence. Such a duty would
not seem to impose an excessive burden upon the landlord. His duty is to
take "whatever precautions are reasonably necessary under the circumstances to
reduce the likelihood of injuries from defects in his property."10 4  In short,
the landlord must shoulder responsibility for the general condition of the prem-
ises. No longer should he be able to allow the premises to become dangerous
due to lack of repairs and still avoid tort liability.
Problems arise when one attempts to discern what is reasonable under the
circumstances. The Sargent decision does not purport to impose liability upon
the landlord for all injuries incurred on the property. He is only liable for
those injuries which are the result of his unreasonable conduct.10 5 For example,
injuries may result from defective conditions within a leased apartment. The
landlord should not be liable for such injuries unless he has failed to take reason-
able precautions under the circumstances. If the tenant has informed the landlord
of the need for repairs, and the landlord has delayed unreasonably in making
such repairs, then the landlord has probably failed to act reasonably under the
circumstances. If the tenant has not informed the landlord of the need for
repairs, then in all probability no liability should be imposed. To hold otherwise
would charge the landlord with a duty to inspect the apartment of his tenant.
Absent an agreement to the contrary, the landlord has no right to inspect the
apartment, 0 G and the Sargent decision does not purport to make inspection of
the leased premises necessary. It is obvious that "under the circumstances" implies
the necessity of notice, and absent notice the landlord is not liable because the
risk of harm would not be foreseeable. Therefore, the landlord is only under
a duty to repair defects within the apartment of which he has notice. Outside
the individual apartments, the landlord is presumed to have notice of anty defects
since he could easily inspect such portions of the premises without enfringing
upon the rights of his tenants. 107 Therefore, the landlord should be liable if
he knew or should have known that the defect existed and was in need of
repair.
There was evidence in Sargent that the landlord had negligently constructed
the stairway and failed to remedy the existing danger. Therefore, the landlord
knew or should have known of the risk of possible harm, and her failure to
repair was unreasonable under the circumstances. In the future landlords can
avoid tort liability by making adequate repairs of all defects within a reasonable
time after notice of the need for such repairs.
104 308 A.2d at 355 (emphasis added).
305 Id. at 532.
10G As a general rule, unless the landlord has reserved a right to enter in the lease agree-
ment, the landlord has no right to enter "'to investigate as to the need of repairs." 49 AN.K
JuR. 2d Landlord &Tenant § 227 (1970).
10 T The leasing of individual houses would present a different situation. Houes are usu-
ally accompanied by adjacent yards. The house as well as the yard are normally rented to the
tenant. The landlord in this case would not be presumed to have notice of exterior defects
because he could not inspect the premises without committing trespass. For house rentals, the
landlord should be under a duty to make repairs only when he has actual notice of defects.
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Another alternative, however, may suggest itself to the astute landlord. The
scope of his duty would be greatly reduced by a lessee's convenant to repair,
If the tenant agrees to repair, the landlord, under the circumstances, is under
no duty. The tenant has absolved the landlord of responsibility. Injured third
parties would then sue the negligent tenant rather than the landlord. There
is no reason why a tenant's convenant to repair should not free the landlord
from liability provided such an agreement is not unconscionable. To the tenant
of a residential unit, however, such a transfer of the duty to repair could argu-
ably be found unconscionable in many cases. For a large building with numerous
tenants, the number and complexity of repairs involved are such that the landlord
is generally much better suited to undertake such a task. Courts have often
recognized this fact.108 Also, in urban housing situations, the tenant often lacks
any significant bargaining power in dealing with the landlord. Tenant covenants
to repair in these instances might be unconscionable. A landlord who negotiated
such an agreement should not escape liability for injuries resulting from the
dangerous conditions of the premises. The unconscionable agreement would not
constitute reasonable precautions under the circumstances to reduce the likelihood
of injuries.
For each one of the infinite possibilities which may arise, the final analysis
will involve the determination of what was reasonable under the circumstances,
If it would be reasonable to expect the landlord to remedy the defect, then
he will have to accept the responsibility for his failure to act.
It is not suggested that abrogation of the landlord's tort immunity will sub-
stantially alleviate all unsatisfactory urban housing conditions. This decision does
not purport to be a panacea for the ills of oppressed tenants. But it does have
two positive effects. First, it frees tenants from liability for injuries caused to
third parties by dangerous conditions which they are powerless to remedy. More
importantly, it gives the tenant a cause of action against his own landlord for
the tenant's injuries due to the unreasonably dangerous condition of the premises,
By expanding the landlord's tort liability, a better opportunity for adequate com-
pensation is offered to injured parties since landlord; would generally be in a
better economic position to pay damages than would most tenants. The imposi-
tion of tort liability also offers more motivation for the landlord to remedy danger.
ous conditions on the property. Such action may help to improve the quality
of housing which will be available to urban tenants. 01 1
108 62 HARV. L. REv. 669, 671 (1949). See sources cited in note 46 supra.
109 Before urban jurisdictions can adopt the Sargent doctrine, a determination must be
made as to how much it will cost. Society is generally willing to accept reasonably safe condi-
tions as opposed to absolutely safe conditions because "absolutely safe" costs too much, For
example, we drive reasonably safe automobiles because absolutely safe autos would be too
slow and too expensive.
The cost of providing defect-free urban housing may prove to be excessive. If the land.
lord must spend several thousand dollars to avoid tort liability, he may not be willing to make
the expenditures, but choose instead to invest his money elsewhere. This would only increase
the public burden to provide suitable housing. If the landlord does make the expenditures,
he will pass them on by means of a rent increase. Many tenants may be unwilling to accept
the increases, and that class of tenants which are in most need of the improvements-slum
residents-are probably the least able to pay. Once again the ultimate cost may have to be
spread amongst the entire public. Until the cost question is answered by empirical data, the
adoption of the Sargent doctrine may be limited to predominantly rural jurisdictions; they
may be the only ones able to afford it.
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The once justifiable basis for landlord tort immunity no longer exists. A
rule designed to meet the purposes of an agrarian society no longer suits the
needs of an industrial community. Society progresses, and the law must follow
suit. As new relationships develop, new rules must evolve to afford the parties
adequate protection. Modern conditions surrounding the landlord-tenant relation-
ship necessitate new legal formulations. The tenant's reliance and dependence
upon the landlord to provide a suitable dwelling and numerous ancillary services
require a new interpretation of the complete transaction. What was once a
simple property conveyance has become a complex contractual arrangement sub.
ject to the accompanying warranties of sales agreements. When the tenant relies
on the landlord to deliver a suitable dwelling, there is no justification for allowing
a landlord to provide defective property and then claim immunity. The law
should demand that the landlord accept liability for the forseeable consequences
of his conduct.
The rationales supporting Sargent v. Ross compel its acceptance by other juris-
dictions. The decision does not rest on local precedent, but instead reveals an
unusual reliance upon legal scholarship. This is not to imply that case law has
been ignored. In fact several of the decisions which the court cites as authority
were partial reformations of the law of landlord-tenant. Realizing that this entire
area of law was in much need of change," 0 the New Hampshire court took
a crucial step in the process of reformation."'
Curliss Isler
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION-MEANING OF WLLFULNESS FOR TAX
FELONIES AND MISDEMEANORS-United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346 (1973).
I. BACKGROUND OF CASE
Cecil J. Bishop, a California lawyer, was convicted of violating § 7206(1)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which provides that anyone who "i'illfully
makes and subscribes any return . . . which contains or is verified by a written
declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which he does
not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter" is guilty of a
felony (emphasis added). Bishop had taken improper deductions on his 1963,
1964, and 1965 income tax returns amounting to more than $45,000. His de-
fense was that he had only failed to check the returns for accuracy after his
office secretary had prepared them. He contended that the kind of willfulness
with which he had acted involved no more than gross negligence or carelessness,
and thus could not have risen to the level of bad faith or evil motive required
110 2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 5 220 (rev. ed. 1973).
111 This is not the first time that the New Hampshire supreme court has departed from
traditional notions of tort liability. The court in general, and Chief Justice Kenhon in par-
ticular, have been quite active in the reformation of inadequate and obsolete tort doctrines.
See MacLeod, Chief Justice Kenison And The Law Of Torts: A Comment On Process, 48
B.U.L. REV. 175 (1968).
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to establish a felony. On that basis, he requested a jury instruction for a lesser-
included-offense.'
A lesser-included-offense instruction is appropriate if (1) some of the ele-
ments of the crime charged also constitute a lesser offense and (2) to convict
of the greater crime, the jury must find a disputed material element not necessary
to convict of the lesser. And here Bishop argued that the lesser offense was a vio-
lation of a misdemeanor statute, § 7207, which provides: "Any person who will-
fully delivers or discloses to the Secretary or his delegate any list, return, account,
statement, or other document, known by him to be fraudulent or false as to any
material matter, shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than
1 year, or both" (emphasis added). According to Bishop, the disputed element
was the degree of scienter necessary to constitute a willful violation. His proposed
instructions would have afforded the jury a choice between a misdemeanor based
on caprice or careless disregard and a felony based on evil purpose.2
The district court refused Bishop's requested instructions and charged tile jury
only on the felony, instructing it to determine whether the defendant intended
to disobey or disregard the law "with evil motive or bad purpose, " a On appeal,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and declared: "Under tile
evidence presented the elements of the two offenses are the same, with the excep-
tion of the element of wilfulness." 4  The Government's petition for certiorari
was granted because of a divergence among the circuits regarding the meaning
of willfulness to be applied in criminal tax cases.5
The Supreme Court upheld the district court's refusal to give the requested
instruction and remanded to the court of appeals for consideration of other issues
it had not reached. 6  The Court held that the standard of willfulness is the
same in both felony and misdemeanor statutes in the criminal tax area. The
1 FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(c) provides: "The defendant may be found guilty of an offense
necessarily included in the offense charged .. "
There are two approaches to the instruction. The common law formulation requires
that all the elements of the lesser crime be present in the greater, so that it would never be
possible to commit the greater without also having committed the lesser offense. 2 C.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 515 (1969). The more recent interpreta.
tion requires only that the facts adduced to prove the greater offense should also have
proved a related lesser offense; under this approach inclusion is allowed even if some ele-
ments of the lesser crime are not found in the charged crime. See United States v. Whit.
aker, 447 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (unlawful entry a lesser offense included within bur.
glary on the facts even though, given the possibility of burglary after permitted entry, It
contained an element not required for burglary). ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(4)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962) provides that an offense is included when "it is established
by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the
offense charged."
The Government in Bishop chose the common law formulation of the lesser-included-
offense rule. Brief for Appellant at 7. Bishop argued that his requested instruction was
warranted by either the Government's chosen approach or the more modern interpretation,
Brief for Respondent at 10.
2 United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346 (1973).
3 412 U.S. at 351.
4 United States v. Bishop, 455 F.2d 612, 614 (9th Cir. 1972). The court of appeals
used the more recent formulation of the lesser-included-offense rule, allowing inclusion based
on evidence adduced.
5 412 U.S. at 348.
6 Id. at 349.
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Court did not expound on the meaning of willfulness except to state that it
implies "a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty" and that it
requires "bad purpose or evil motive." 7
The brief for Bishop made two arguments in favor of interpreting misde-
meanor willfulness to require something less than the bad purpose or evil motive
required in felony cases. First, such a standard would be consistent with that
traditionally required for "other purely statutory misdemeanors,"S since willfulness
is typically treated as meaning "intentional" in crimes which do not involve moral
turpitude.9  For instance, the Model Penal Code provides: "A requirement that
an offense be committed wilfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with
respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further
requirements appears."'o "Knowingly" and "intentionally" fall short of the men-
tal element of "bad purpose or evil motive." The Bishop Court did not address
this point."
Bishop's second argument concerned a potential overlap between tax felony
and tax misdemeanor statutes which would arguably result from a uniform defini-
tion of willfulness.12 Bishop contended that "but for" a variation in the level of
willfulness, §§ 7206(1) and 7207 would be exact duplicates in the area of income
tax returns. Section 6065(a)i provides that, subject to change by the Secretary
or his delegate, each income tax return shall contain a written declaration that it
is made under penalty of perjury. Treasury regulations14 require everyone who
signs a tax return to verify that it is made under penalty of perjury if the return
contains such a declaration.. Thus, asserted Bishop, it is impossible to file a false
income tax return (a violation of § 7207) without incurring the penalty of perjury
(a violation~of § 7206(1)).15
7Id. at 360, 361.
8 Brief for Respondent at 18.
9 R. PERKINs, CImiNAL LAw 780 (2d ed. 1969).
10 ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(8) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
1 One author's discussion rebuts Bishop's contention:
As a practical matter, the turpitudinous element in what is now the misdemeanor
and in what is the felony is the same. When a taxpayer decides that he is going
to defraud the government, he does not choose between non-filing and filing
fraudulently because one is more or less moral than the other;, rather, he picks one
instead of the other because he thinks that, with the one he picks, his chances of
remaining undiscovered will be greater. Consequently, the distinction between the
two crimes is meaningless.
Gilman, Current Problems in Criminal Tax Fraud, 33 TAxE'S 749, 751 (1955).
12 Brief for Respondent at 13.
13 CODE, § 6065 (a) provides:
Except as otherwise provided by the Secretary or his delegate, any return, declara-
tion, statement, or other document required to be made under any provision of the
internal revenue laws or regulations shall contain or be verified by a written dec-
laration that it is made under the penalties of perjury.
14 Treas. Reg. § 1.6065-1(a) (1959) provides:
If a return, declaration, statement, or other document . . . is required by the
regulations contained in this chapter, or the form and instructions . . . to contain
or be verified by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of per-jury, such return, declaration, statement, or other document shall be so verified by
the person signing it.
15 Brief for Respondent at 12, 13.
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The Court in the past has responded to such claims of overlap by initially
assuming that Congress would not create criminal statutes which are identical
as to the elements Df the offense but which vary as to penalty.l" At the same
time, the Court has always recognized that some criminal tax statutes are specific
and thus may be included within other more general ones. 17 Even so, the Court
has been more willing to find a complete overlap of statutes on a given state
of facts than to define willfulness as a variable.18
In Bishop, the Court took the position that tax statutes with otherwise distin-
guishable elements do not overlap merely because they share a common element
of willfulness. "Congress distinguished the statutes," observed the Court, "in
ways that do not turn on the meaning of the word 'willfully.' "19 In general,
felonies are differentiated from misdemeanors by the "additional misconduct" re-
quired for felonies.2 0
In this case, the Court found various grounds on which to distinguish §
7206(1) from § 7207. For instance, Congress has authorized the Secretary or
his delegate to eliminate the perjury declaration on returns. Such action would
render § 7206(1) inoperative but would not affect § 7207. Furthermore, the
felony section applies only to the maker of a return who does not believe it
to be true, whereas the misdemeanor section includes anyone, whether or not
he is the maker, who delivers or discloses a return which he knows to be false,
Thus the Court was able to differentiate the sections wholly in terms of elements
other than willfulness.
II. DEFINITION OF WILLFULNESS
After Bishop, the definition of willfulness is uniform in all the offenses in-
cluded in §§ 7201 to 7207. In order to establish that a violation was willful,
the Government must prove: (1) a legal duty;2 ' (2) knowledge of that duty;
'0Achilli v. United States, 353 U.S. 373 (1957); Berra v. 'United States, 351 U.S. 131,
135 (1956) (Black, J. dissenting). One writer supports this assumption: "If a defendant
can be indicted on the same state of facts for either a felony or a misdemeanor, it would
follow that a grand jury or the U.S. Attorney or both together would have uncontrolled
power to say how a person filing a false income tax return shall be prosecuted and pun-
ished." Comment, Alternative Criminal Penalties for Wilfully Filing a False Income Tax
Return, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 82,86 (1956).
17 "[Section 7201] necessarily includes among its elements actions which, if isolated from
the others, constitute lesser offenses in this hierarchical system of sanctions." Sansone v.
United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351 (1965).
18 See Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343 (1965); Berra v, United States, 351 U.S.
131 (1956).
19 412 U.S. at 358.
20 Id.
21 The duty contained in each Code section is listed below:
Section Duty
7201 Not to evade tax or payment thereof
7202 Collect or account for and pay over taxes
7203 Pay taxes, make returns, keep records, supply information
7204 Deduct or withhold employment taxes, furnish statement
7205 Supply information to employer
7206(1) Make and subscribe form believed true and correct as to every ma-
terial matter
7206(2) Not to participate in preparation of document known to be false
7207 Not to deliver or disclose false document
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(3) a violation of the duty which is voluntary and intentional.2 In addition, the
Court in Bishop declared that it "shall continue to require, in both tax felonies
and tax misdemeanors that must be done 'willfully,' the bad purpose or evil motive
described in Murdock . 23. "
The Bishop Court does not define "bad purpose or evil motive" except by
reference to the Court's use of those terms in Murdock.2 4  In that case, the
taxpayer refused to supply information in violation of the predecessor to § 72032
and invoked his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination in good faith
but without legal grounds. His failure to supply information was held not will-
ful. Unfortunately, the Murdock opinion does not elaborate on the language
it uses ("act done with a bad purpose"). It does, however, list three supporting
Supreme Court cases. Two of these cases held that bad purpose requires more
than a knowing violation,2 0 while the third case held sufficient "a specific intent
to violate the statute."27  Despite the discrepancies among the cases upon which
it relied, Murdock itself explicitly rejects the position that an intentional violation
of a tax misdemeanor statute without an evil motive is enough to establish willful-
ness. 28  The reference to Murdock in the Bishop opinion may therefore imply
the latter Court's acceptance of the proposition that bad purpose or evil motive
is not the equivalent of an intentional violation of a tax obligation. 2o
But the requirement of bad purpose or evil motive in order to establish will-
fulness is objectionable for two principal reasons. First, the Government, in
order to prove an element of the offense, and the defendant, in order to fashion
his defense, would have to develop standards by which to separate good purposes
or motives from evil ones. The difficulty of defining in this context what consti-
tute "good" motives has been perceptively identified by one court: "Would it
be a good purpose to fail to pay income taxes in order to pay medical expenses
for a sick wife or child? Would it be a bad purpose to fail to pay taxes
to use the money to bet on horse races?"30
The jury instructions on willfulness prepared by the Judicial Conference Com-
mittee on Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit provide one uncontrovertible
definition of a bad purpose: "evading a known tax obligation in order to defraud
the government of that tax.''31 However, this instruction was prepared for felony
22 412 U.S. at 360.
23-412 U.S. at 361.
24 United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
25 INT. REV. Acr OF 1928, § 146(9).
•0 Felton v. United States, 96 U.S. 699 (1877); Potter v. United States, 155 U.S. 438
(1894).
27 Spurr v. United States, 174 U.S. 728, 735 (1899).
28 "The respondents refusal to answer was intentional and without legal justification, but
the jury might nevertheless find that it was not prompted by bad faith or evil intent, which
the statute makes an element of the offense." 290 U.S. at 397-98.
29 "AMurdock seems to indicate that, to find willfulness under the misdemeanor statute,
the omission must be more than a voluntary and intentional failure done without justifiable
legal excuse. It must be done with an evil motive, evil intent, bad purpose, and/or bad
faith." Orlando, "'lVillIully" Under Section 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
74 Dic.. L REV. 563, 569 (1970).
'o United States v. Martell, 199 F.2d 670, 672 (3d Cir. 1952).
31 TAX FRAUD 250 (G. Holmes & J. Cox eds. 1973); tee E. MORTENSON, FEDERAL
TAx FRAUD LAW § 68 (1958): "The intent to evade taxation is of itself an evil purpose."
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tax offenses. Tax misdemeanors do not require the existence of a tax liability
as do the felony provisions of § 7201, so a purpose to defraud the Government
of a tax due and owing does not exhaust the possible bad purposes for tax
offenses.
Moreover, neither Bishop nor Murdock indicated whether bad purpose or
evil motive refers to the immediate intent or, instead, to an ultimate goal.
A person often acts with two or more intentions. These intentions may
consist of an immediate intention (intent) and an ulterior one (motive),
as where the actor takes another's money intending to steal it and intend-
ing then to use it to buy food for his needy family.32
If a taxpayer fails to file a return because he believes it is an invasion of privacy
or fails to pay a tax because he is morally outraged at expenditures of government
revenues, he has an immediate intent to prevent the Government from receiving
the return or the taxes. The taxpayer's motive may not be evil, but his intention
is to violate a known duty. If the Bishop Court is directing the lower courts
to focus on motive in order to identify willfulness, it has created an element
of a tax offense which is almost unsusceptible of piroof.
Relief from such a heavy prosecutorial burden may be obtained by defining
motive or purpose to mean intent. At least one court has managed to perform
such a sleight of hand:
[TJhe only bad purpose or bad motive, which it is necessary for the
Government to prove in this case is the deliberate intention not to file
ieturns which the defendant knew ought to have been filed, so that the
Government would not know the extent of the liability.83
To the extent that the preceding definition makes motive synonymous with in-
tent it is unfortunate and clearly erroneous.3  Nevertheless, an inference that
the Bishop Court had in mind just such a definition can be drawn from its stated
reason for requiring bad purpose or evil motive. The Court said it was imple-
menting the intent of Congress to protect the "well-meaning, but easily confused,
mass of taxpayers"3 5 from the imposition of criminal penalties. However, this
avowed purpose can be easily achieved by merely requiring an intentional violation
of a known duty; injecting evil motive into the criminal tax scheme is surplusage.
No additional protection is afforded good faith taxpayers, and yet the Government
is hamstrung by having to establish a defendant's motives as an element of the
offense. It is doubtful, therefore, whether the Court furthered what it perceived
to be congressional policy by defining willfulness, or intent, which is clearly an
element of a criminal offense, in terms of motive, or purpose, which is not. It
would seem unfortunate if, as a result of Bishop, courds were to become preoc-
32W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAw 200 (1972) (footnote omitted).
33 Yarborough v. United States, 230 F.2d 56, 61 (4th Cir. 1956). A district court con-
siderably weakened this definition by interpreting "so that" to mean "with the result that,"
thereby contradicting the Murdock requirement that bad purpose be more than intentional
violation. United States. v. Fullerton, 189 F. Supp. 211, 215 (D. Md. 1960).
34 "Motive," as used in the context of criminal law, is usually synonomous with "reason"
or "inducement," and is thus to be distinguished from the specific intent, knowledge, and
bad purpose required to make out a tax offense. R. SCHMIDT, LEGAL AND ACCOUNTING
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL TAX FRAUD § 2.2 at 40 (1963).
35 412 U.S. at 361.
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cupied with the subjective purity of the motives of a taxpayer whose violation was
dearly intentional.
Although the meaning of willfulness remains unclear despite its extensive
treatment by the Court, it is clear that willfulness requires a level of scienter
at least equivalent to knowledge. Gross negligence or carelessness is no longer
sufficient to establish willfulness. Also, the same standard of willfulness obtains
in tax misdemeanors as in tax felonies. As a result, a lesser-included-offense
instruction will not be available to defendants where the degree of willfulness
is the only disputed element of the offense charged. Juries, deprived of the
option of finding the accused guilty of a lesser crime, may be forced to grant
felony convictions in cases which involve only a minimal degree of willfulness.
The failure of Bishop to dispell the confusion surrounding the meaning of
willfulness is indicated by subsequent appellate court opinions which either have
ignored the requirement of bad purpose or evil motive 0 or have paid lip service
by reciting the words without elaboration.3 T The deficiencies in the opinion are
unfortunate because the general criminal law has in the past borrowed its defini-
tion of willfulness from criminal tax cases.38 The suggestion which emanates
from Bishop that motive is intrinsic to willfulness could have far-reaching effect.39
III. FUTURE EFFECTS OF BISHOP
Bishop can be read to support three contradictory propositions. The Court
may have intended to make motive an element of every tax offense requiring
willfulness. If so, the prosecutorial burden will be extremely heavy and valid
defenses will abound. Another possible result is that the prosecution does not
have to prove motive, but defenses based on lack of bad purpose or evil motive
will be available. Defenses of this type were frequently asserted before Bishop
without success, and their fate after Bishop is examined below. A third inter-
pretation creates an equivalence between motive and intent, so that proof of an
intentional violation of a known duty suffices to establish willfulness. Interpreted
thus, the words "bad purpose or evil motive" add nothing of substance to the
definition of willfulness. The existence of three defensible characterizations of
Bishop muddies analysis of the results of the case. However, given that knowl-
edge is now the minimum possible scienter requirement for willfulness, and that
this level of scienter is uniform in tax felonies and tax misdemeanors, one can
conjecture as to probable effects of Bishop.
A. On Governmental Prosecation
A major purpose of criminal tax prosecution is deterrence of potential future
violators.40 To that effect, possible cases undergo a screening procedure within
36 United States v. DiVarco, 484 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1973).
3 7 United States v. Andros, 484 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1973).
3sSee, e.g., United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 303 U.S. 239, 242 (1938); Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 (1945).
-3 For example, The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77X (1971) and The Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1971) require a willful violation.
4 0 Boughner, How Practitioners Should Handle Willful Failure to File Caser, 32 J. TAX.
46 (1970).
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the Treasury Department to insure that only cases with an excellent chance of
conviction are prosecuted. In 1971, seventy-two million returns out of over one
hundred-thirteen million were mathematically verified, and the Intelligence Divi-
sion of the Department of the Treasury forwarded to the Justice Department
for prosecution only 1,021 income tax and miscellaneous criminal tax cases.11
Will this small number of cases decrease further in view of the fact that
a showing of caprice or careless disregard will no longer be sufficient to establish
a willful misdemeanor? It is difficult to determine how the greater burden of
proof will affect government prosecutors, though they have long been faced with
an identical burden in felony cases. It at least seems safe to predict that if
the taxpayer is disreputable and there exists clear proof of a repetitive pattern
of evasion, Treasury officials will recommend criminal prosecution notwithstanding
lack of convincing proof of willfulness. 42 These considerations may mitigate the
effect of Bishop on misdemeanor prosecutions.
Some misdemeanor statutes are so seldom used for prosecution that the Bishop
definition of willfulness is irrelevant for them. Three of the four offenses con-
tained in § 7203 have fallen into disuse: nonpayment of taxes, prosecution for
failure to supply information, and prosecution for failure to keep records.48 The
very section Bishop wished to use as a lesser-included-offense, § 7207, is not
only languishing from neglect, but the Treasury Department is actually lobbying
for its repeal as useless. 44 Thus the willfulness standard for failure to pay taxes
and for filing fraudulent returns has always been equivalent to a felony standard
in practice, since those offenses have been prosecuted under the corresponding
felony statutes or not at all.
One provision which may be seriously affected by a more stringent scienter
requirement for willful misdemeanors is the "failure to file" charge, the only
really viable part of § 7203. Speculation has been that "as data processing be.
comes more effective, it is likely that failure-to-file cases will be on the increase."45
Despite this trend, the Government, after Bishop, may be reluctant to recommend
prosecution under that section unless it can prove a repetitive pattern of failure
to file and the taxpayer is not the sort likely to elicit sympathy from a jury.
B. On Defendants
The number of cases forwarded to the Justice Department is directly related
to the number of cases finally prosecuted. If the Government brings fewer tax
fraud cases, fewer taxpayers will find themselves defending criminal charges.
4 1 McCall, The Dimensions of Tax Fraud, TAX FRAUD 15 (G. Holmes & J. Cox eds,
1973).
4 2 H. BALTER, TAX FRAUD AND EVASION § 13.3 (3d ed. 1963). In Holland v. United
States, 348 U.S. 121, 139 (1954), the Court gave its imprimatur to inferring willfulness
from a consistent pattern of violations.
4 3 R. SCHMIDT, LEGAL AND ACcOUNTING HANDBOOK OF 1EDIIRAL TAX FRAUD 62
(1963).
44Lynch, Basic Criminal Penalties, TAX FRAUD 12 (G. Holmes & J. Cox eds. 1973).
Section 7206 is increasingly used, according to Lyon, The lajor Penalties for Tax Fraul,
TA FRAUD CASES 9 (Practising Law Institute, Tax Law and Practice-Course Handbook
Series No. 12, 1969).




A taxpayer who is unfortunate enough to become a defendant may be bene-
fited by a greater range of possible defenses if Bishop has added motive to
the elements of tax offenses, or has at least allowed benevolent motives as an
independent defense. For example, the defense of emotional disturbance is often
used by defendants and rarely accepted by courtsO After Bishop, a defendant's
showing that he is incapable of forming the requisite evil motive for conviction
may be a valid defense.47 Similarly, an intent to comply in the future may
be an acceptable defense as showing lack of bad purpose or evil motive4 8 A
mistaken belief, albeit held perversely in the face of contradictory information,
may now provide a defense even if motive is not considered an element, because
it vitiates the knowledge or intent required for a willful violation0 9 In short,
any explanation which is a believable alternative to a bad purpose or evil motive
could conceivably defeat the criminal charge if motive is an element or a defense.
Although Bishop for the most part seems to aid defendants, it saddles them
with at least one very dear disadvantage: the unavailability of a lesser-included-
offense instruction when all the elements of the greater offense except willfulness
are clearly proved. 50 On the other hand, if the Government's proof of willfulness
after Bishop is doubtful enough to have warranted a lesser-included-offense in-
struction under the disapproved felony-misdemeanor willfulness dichotomy, that
weakness should now warrant acquittal because the proof of willfulness would
necessarily be inadequate to sustain a misdemeanor conviction. Logically, Bishop
leaves the defendant's position either unchanged or strengthened as regards the
effect of the Government's failure to meet the willfulness test.
In actuality, this must not be the case, else Bishop would not have appealed
the district court's refusal of the lesser-included-offense instruction. It is apparent
that providing a jury with an alternative offense on which to convict, even one
much less severe than that charged, increases the chances of a finding that the
Government failed to establish the requisite degree of willfulness for a felony
conviction. If the only alternative is to acquit altogether, the jury is probably
more hesitant to find insufficient the Government's proof of willfulness. If this
analysis is correct (and it seems to be borne out in the Bishop case) to deny
defendants a lesser-included-offense instruction on willfulness as a variable is to
increase the chances of a felony conviction on a tenuous showing of willfulness.
46See, e.g., United States v. Haseltine, 419 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Fahey, 411 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 957 (1969).
47See Ritholz, Intent and Psychiatric Disturbances in Tax Fraud Cases, N.Y.U. 23D
INST. ON FED. TAX. 1339 (1965).
48 This defense was held insufficient in Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 353-54
(1965), and in United States v. Edwards, 375 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1967).
4 For example, the belief that income as low as $1,500 does not trigger the obligation
to file income tax returns, Martin v. United States, 317 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1963); the belief
that filing of a return must be accompanied by payment of the tax, Abdul v. United States,
254 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 832 (19C0); Ripperger v. United
States, 248 F.2d 944 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 940 (1958).
50The Government may also be harmed by this result. A lesser-included-offense in-
struction has traditionally helped prosecutors whose cases were weak. See Brief for Peti-
tioner at 2, United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346 (1973); 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 515 (1969).
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IV. CONCLUSION
In the end, one returns to the lesser-included-offense context within which
the Bishop case was heard. The Court chose to concentrate on the meaning
of willfulness rather than on the question whether the lesser-included-offense in-
struction requested in this case would ever be appropriateY' t While the unavail-
ability of a lesser-included-offense instruction when the disputed element is will.
fulness is settled, the Court has yet to define the limits of the lesser-included-
offense theory.
The Government must now show a voluntary and intentional violation of
a known legal duty and bad purpose or evil motive. Exactly what bad purpose
or evil motive means is unclear, largely because the Bishop Court approved Altr.
dock's definition without recognizing that Murdock is one of the principal sources
of ambiguity in the interpretation of willfulness. Cases after Bishop will probably
show that further clarification by the Supreme Court is required.
Diana S. Donaldson
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INAPPLICABILITY OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
CONDITIONS DOCTRINE TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE-Christian Echoes Na.
tional Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
I. INTRODUCTION
Corporations operated for religious, charitable, scientific, public safety testing,
literary, and educational purposes are granted tax exempt status by § 501 (c) (3)
of the Internal Revenue Code.' This exemption, however, is not available to
organizations that spend a substantial part of their activities attempting to influ-
ence legislation.2 In Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United Stales,a
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit expansively construed
the § 501(c)(3) limitation on "attempting to influence legislation," and held
that the statute abridged neither the freedom of speech nor freedom of religion
of the taxpayer. In its opinion, the court implicitly rejected the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, which says that the government cannot condition the granting
of its privileges or benefits on the waiver of constitutionally guaranteed rights.
51412 U.S. at 361 n.9.
I INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(3) [hereinafter cited as CODBJ. All citations are to
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 unless otherwise indicated.
" CODE § 501(c)(3) (emphasis added) exempts the following organizations from taxation,
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety,
literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or ani-
mals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private share-
holder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation, and which does not
participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of state-
ments), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office.
:3 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
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This casenote will develop a rationale. for the Tenth Circuit's unwillingness
to apply the doctrine to the Internal Revenue Code.
First, the varied judicial interpretations of the proscription on influencing
legislation prior to Christian Echoes will be examined. Then the Tenth Circuit's
inclusion of grassroots lobbying within that statutory prohibition will be demon-
strated. Finally, the historical origins of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
which resulted from the now discredited right-privilege distinction, will be ana-
lyzed. It is hoped that this discussion will demonstrate that application of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine to the Internal Revenue Code would be inap-
propriate, due to the absence of a model income tax structure. The unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrifie is applicable only when a government privilege or bene-
fit is present. But without a model tax structure to define what a tax benefit
is in the first place, courts have no standards by which to determine when such
a benefit has been revoked. Thus, attempts to constitutionalize the Internal Rev-
enue Code by employing a doctrine premised upon the existence of government
largess woud be unsound and inexpedient.
II. CHRISTIAN ECHOES' EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION OF
THE PROSCRIPTION ON INFLUENCING LEGISLATION
In 1953 Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc., a non-profit religious corpo-
ration, qualified as a tax-exempt religious and educational organization within
the meaning of § 101(6) of the 1939 Code.4 In 1966, based on a review
of Christian Exchoes' activities during 1961-63, the Internal Revenue Service for-
mally revoked the corporation's exempt status. After unsuccessfully protesting
this revocation, Christian Echoes sued for a tax refund5 in federal district court.
There it was held that Christian Echoes qualified for the § 501 (c) (3) exemption.0
The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that Christian Echoes was not tax-exempt be-
cause "[t]he activities of Christian Echoes in influencing or attempting to influence
legislation were not incidental, but were substantial and continuous."7 Thus the
court concluded that the corporation was within the § 501 (c) (3) exclusion from
exemption.
The critical issue in the case was whether or not the § 501(c) (3) limitation
on attempts to influence legislation should be broadly or narrowly interpreted.
The district court had narrowly defined "legislation" to mean a specific bill
before Congress. 8 The Tenth Circuit rejected the lower court's interpretation
4 INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 101(6) (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(3) ).
5Although Christian Echoes sued only for a refund of F.I.C.A. taxes paid for 1961 and
1963-68, the decision affected its entire tax exempt status.
GChristian Echoes Nat'l Ministry v. United States, No. 67-C-114 (N.D. Okla., June 24,
1971). The government had appealed the decision of the District Court to the Supreme Court,
contending the Supreme Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1970) which allows
a direct appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision "of any court of the United States ...
holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any civil action, suit, or proceeding to which
the United States ... is a party." The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded
for the entry of a fresh decree, stating that the District Court had not held § 501(c)(3) uncon-
stitutional. United States v. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc., 404 U.S. 561 (1972).
The government then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
7470 F.2d at 856.
8 Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, No. 67-C-114 (N.D. Okla., June
24, 1971).
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and construed "legislation" to include not only specific bills before Congress,
but also current issues which the public might encourage Congress to consider.
The court of appeals relied on a treasury regulation that defined legislation as
"action by the Congress, by any State legislature, by any local council or similar
governing body, or by the public in a referendum, initiative, constitutional amend.
ment or similar procedure," and indicated that an organization attempts to infln.
ence legislation if it "contacts, or urges the public to contact, members of a legis.
lative body for the purpose of proposing, supporting, or opposing legislation,'"
The court concluded that any attempts to influence the legislative process, either
directly by urging the public to contact Congressmen concerning specific bills
or current issues, or indirectly by simply attempting to influence the public (grass-
roots lobbying), would be attempting to influence legislation within the meaning
of the statute. The court then listed twenty-two specific attempts by Christian
Echoes to influence public opinion through grassroots lobbying:
For example, Christian Echoes appealed to its readers to: (1) write their
Congressmen in order to influence the political decisions in Washington;
(2) work in politics at the precinct level; (3) support the Becker
Amendment by writing their Congressmen; (4) maintain the McCarran-
Walter Immigration law; (5) contact their Congressmen in opposition
to the increasing interference with freedom of speech in the United
States; (6) purge the American press of its responsibility for grossly
misleading its readers on vital issues; (7) inform their Congressmen that
the House Committee on Un-American Activities must be retained; (8)
oppose an Air Force Contract to disarm the United States; (9) dispel the
mutual mistrust between North and South America; (10) demand a con-
gressional investigation of the biased reporting of major television net-
works; (11) support the Dirksen Amendment; (12) demand that Con-
gress limit foreign aid spending; (13) discourage support for the World
Court; (14) support the Connally Reservation; (15) cut off diplomatic
relations with communist countries; (16) reduce the federal payroll by
discharging needless jobholders, stop waste of public funds and balance
the budget; (17) stop federal aid to education, socialized medicine and
public housing; (18) abolish the federal income tax; (19) end Amer-
ican diplomatic recognition of Russia; (21) outlaw the Communist Party
in the United States; and (22) to restore our immigration laws.10
The court also listed eight specific instances of what it termed "attempts" to
influence legislation through an indirect campaign to mold public opinion." These
examples included activities relating to civil rights legislation, medicare, the Post-
age Revision Act of 1967, the Honest Election Law of 1967, the Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty, the Panama Canal Treaty, firearms control legislation, and the Outer
Space Treaty."
To support its view that "legislation" included indirect campaigns to mold
public opinion, the court relied upon Cammarano v. Uniled States. 2 C'animarano
consolidated the case of a Washington taxpayer who spent money to help defeat
an initiative to place the retail sale of wine and beer into the hands of the
oTreas.Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii) (1959).
10 470 F.2d at 855.
11Id.
12 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
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state and the case of an Arkansas taxpayer who expended funds to defeat a
statewide prohibition initiative. Both taxpayers were in the business of selling
liquor and deducted the sums spent under what is now § 162(a).13 'While
Cammarano denied deductions for promoting legislation, the Tenth Circuit's re-
liance on that case is misplaced because of two important differences between the
cases.
The first difference is that in Cammarano the taxpayers spent money to help
defeat specific initiative measures that were before the voters. The treasury regu-
lations in force at that time14 contained a broad proscription against deducting
"sums of money expended for lobbying purposes, the promotion or defeat of
legislation, the exploitation of propaganda...." Justice Harlan, in pointing
out that these voter initiatives were plainly within the meaning of "legislation"
under the regulations, observed that "[t]he Constitutions of the States of Wash-
ington and Arkansas both explicitly recognize that in providing for initiatives
they are vesting legislative power in the people."'15 Thus, Cammarano holds
that when the people have undertaken the legislative function through an initiative
measure which if passed would become law, "attempting to influence legislation"
includes direct appeals to the people. In Christian Echoes, however, the people
were not in a position to exercise legislative power directly; the corporation was
merely advocating its views to influence public opinion in general. Thus the
Christian Echoes court expanded the proscription into the area of grassroots lobby-
ing.
The second difference is that in declaring that the regulations in question
had "acquired the force of law,"' 0 the Cammarano Court relied upon the fact
that the regulations were "an expression of a sharply defined national policy,
further demonstration of which may be found in other sections of the Internal
Revenue Code."' 7 This national policy was that the Treasury must stand apart
from all political agitation.18 Doubts have been raised whether any such sharply
defined policy existed when Cammarano was decided, 19 and since the enactment
of § 162(e) in 1962,20 it is even more doubtful that any such policy exists
today.
There is no mention whatsoever of any policy of political and Treasury separa-
13 INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 23(a)(1)(A).
14 Treas, Reg. 111, §§ 29.23(o)-i, 29.23(q)-i (1943).
15 Camnarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 506 (1959) (emphasis added).
16Id. at 510.
37Id. at 508.
18 Id. at 512.
19 See Cooper, The Tax Treatment of Business Grassroots Lobbying: Defining and Attain-
ing the Public Policy Objectives, (8 COLUM. L REv. 801, 808-09 (1968); Note, Deducting
Business Expenses Designed to Influence Governmental Policy at "Ordinary and Necessary":
Cammarano v. United States and a Bit Beyond, 69 YALE L J. 1017, 1023-25 (1960).
20 Section 162(e) was added to the Code by the Revenue Act of 1962 Pub. L No. 87-834.
§ 3, 76 Stat. 960. Section 162(e) allows deductions for business expenses for direct communi-
cations with members of Congress or state legislatures concerning legislation. Some of the leg-
islative history suggests that § 162(e) was a knowing reaction to Cammaraano rather than an at-
tempt to codify the status quo. 108 CONG. REC. 18492 (1962) (remarks of Senator Robert
Kerr). In any event the passage of § 162(e) curtails the utility of the Cammarano holding in
guiding current court decisions since Cammarano based its decision on a sharply defined pol-
icy of political and treasury separation which does not exist today.
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tion in the legislative history of the § 501 (c) (3) limitation on influencing
legislation.23 1 Indeed, when § 501 (c) (3)'s predeces:;or was enacted, that provi-
sion was aimed only at the disallowance of deductions for donations intended
to advance selfish economic interests of the donor.2 2  However, the difficulties
of articulating such a standard resulted in a broadly phrased statute that "went
further than the committee intended to go."23
Other evidence also demonstrates that no such policy of Treasury and political
separation exists today. For example, under § 501(c) (4),24 organizations oper-
ated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare are exempt regardless of
their attempts to influence legislation. Similarly, fraternal beneficiary societies,
trade associations, and chambers of commerce are exempt under sections other
than § 501 (c) (3),23 without reference to what effect their activities may have
upon the political process.2 Contributions to § 501 (c) (3) organizations have
more impact on the amount of revenue raised by the treasury than do contributions
to some other exempt organizations, such as organization:; exempt under § 501 (c) (4),
because the donor may deduct them under § 170(c) (3). However, contributions
to veterans' organizations exempt under § 501 (c) (19) and to fraternal benefi-
ciary societies exempt under §§ 501 (c) (8) and (10) are also deductible under
§§ 170(c) (3) and (4). Since the latter organizations are not restricted in their
political activity, the policy of Treasury and political separation articulated in
Cammarano is apparently undercut by the allowance of either exempt status orde-
ductible contributions to an organization engaged in political activity.
21 See 78 CONG. REC. 5861 (1934).
22 See statement of Mortimer M. Caplin at Hearings on H.R. 13720 Be/ore the House
Committee on Ways and Means, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972), pp. 35-36; statement of George
Cooper at 259-60; statement of Edwin S. Cohen at 17-20; Troyer, Charities, Law-Making, and
the Constitution: The Validity of the Restrictions on Influencing Legislation, N.Y.U. 31ST
INST. ON FED. TAx. 14-15, 1432-33 (1973) [hereinafter citcd as Troyer).
23 Senator Reed said:
There is no reason in the world why a contribution made to the National Econo-
my League should be deductible as if it were a charitable contribution if it is a selfish
one made to advance the personal interests of the giver of the money. That is what
the committee were trying to reach; but we found great difficulty in phrasing the
amendment.. . . I think we gave [the draftsmen] an impossible task; but this amend-
ment goes much further than the committee intended to go.
78 CONG. REC. 5861 (1934).
24 CODE, § 501(c)(4) exempts the following organizations from taxation:
Civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for
the promotion of social welfare, or local associations of employees, the membetship
of which is limited to the employees of a designated person or persons in a particu-
lar municipality, and the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable,
educational, or recreational purposes.
A social welfare organization may qualify under § 501(c)(4) even though it is an "action"
organization described in paragraph (c)(3)(ii) or (iv) of Treas, Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 if It
otherwise qualifies under this section. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)( 4)-1 (a)(2)(ii) (1959).
2 5 CODE §§ 501(c)(19), 501(c)(8), 501(c)(10), 501(c)(5) and 501(c)(6).
20The following organizations are exempt under various sections of the Code: American
Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Elks, the Moose, the Eagles, the Masons, the Shriners,
the Knights of Columbus, AFL-CIO, United Auto Workers, American Farm Bureau, National
Farmers Union, American Medical Association, National Chamber of Commerce, American
Petroleum Institute, and the American Bankers Association. Troyer, supra note 22.
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In short, Cammarano does not support the Tenth Circuits expansive definition
of "attempting to influence legislation" at the grassroots level when the public
is not wielding legislative power. Nor does Cammarano provide valid policy
reasons which can be the basis of a broad construction of "legislation" in Christian
Echoes.
The Internal Revenue Code's restriction against carrying on propaganda or
influencing legislation may have resulted from Judge Learned Hand's opinion in
Slee v. Commissioner,-7 a Second Circuit decision affirming a Board of Tax Ap-
peals (BTA) disallowance of deduction for contributions to the American Birth
Control League. Although the proscription against influencing legislation was not
then in the Internal Revenue Act,2 s the Second Circuit affirmed the BTA's deter-
mination that a purpose in the League's charter of enlisting the support of legisla-
tors "to effect the lawful repeal"29 of existing laws prevented the League from
being exclusively charitable.
Four years after the Slee decision, Congress enacted a provision denying tax
exemptions to organizations that expended money for carrying on propaganda
or otherwise attempting to influence legislation.3 0 By this enactment Congress
may have intended either (1) to enact explicitly the Slee holding that political
agitation is outside the statute or (2) to make deductions more readily available
than had Slee and other cases 3' by permitting insubstantial political activity and
attempts to influence legislation. The Senate debates suggest that the latter con-
struction is the correct one, and that the sponsors sought only to prohibit tax
deductions for contributions that would fund political agitation to further the
selfish interests of the donor.32 Due to the difficulties of articulating such a
standard, however, a broadly phrased statute was drafted, and the courts have
varied in their interpretations of what activity is disallowed by the statute.
In the non-tax area charitable purposes have been defined as purposes the
accomplishment of which is beneficial to the community.3 3 United States courts
have rejected the English view that a trust otherwise for a charitable purpose
is not charitable if a change in existing laws is required to cffectuate its purpose.3 4
In the tax area, however, charitable purposes have been made inconsistent with
political activity by § 501(c)(3)'s proscription against substantial activities at-
27 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930).
28 Internal Revenue Act 1921, § 214(a)(11)(B); Revenue Acts 1924 and 1926, § 214(a)-
(10), 26 U.S.C. § 955 (a)(10).
29 42 F.2d at 185.
30 40 Stat. 690, 700, 755, 760 (1934).
31 See Note, Political Activity and Tax Exempt Organizations Before and After the Tax Re-
form Act of 1969,38 GEO. WAsH. L REv. 1114, 1118 (1970).
32 See, e.g., note 23 supra.
33 4 A. ScoTr, LAw OF TRusTs § 368, at 2853 (3d ed. 1967).
34 1d. § 374A at 2912:
Many reforms can be accomplished only by a change in the law, and there seems to
be no good reason why the mere fact that they can be accomplished only through leg-
islation should prevent them from being valid charitable purpoes. The courts have
upheld trusts for the improvement of the structure and methods of government,
trus:s for the prohibition of the manufacture and sale of liquor, trusts for various
other objects, although in each case the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust
involved a change in existing law.
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tempting to influence legislation. In applying this restriction, courts have used
two basic analyses in determining what kind of activities are "substantial": (1)
a quantitative analysis in which the proportion of the organization's political activ-
ities in relation to its other activities must be less than substantial, and (2)
a qualitative analysis in which the nature of the political activities is considered.
Courts employing the quantitative analysis look to the amount of activity that
constitutes legislative activity as the determining factor, ignoring whether public
interests or private, selfish interests are served.3a  Courts employing the qualitative
analysis of "attempting to influence legislation" seem to have added a judicial
gloss to the proscription, interpreting it to mean "attempting to influence legisla-
tion for non-charitable purposes."' (; Accordingly, applications of the qualitative
standard under § 501(c)(3) have permitted exemption of charities consistent
with the common law of charities while applications of the quantitative standard
restrict the common law even further.
The Tenth Circuit employed the quantitative approach in determining whether
the activities of Christian Echoes were within the statutory proscription and relied
on three cases in which the courts also used the quantitative approach. But
the Tenth Circuit expanded the proscription beyond the interpretations in any
of those cases into the area of grassroots lobbying and in so doing raised a
constitutional question with respect to the § 501 (c) (3) prohibitions on Christian
Echoes' activities.
'3 The quantitative approach is illustrated in Kuper v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 562 (3d
Cir. 1964) in which the Third Circuit found that a substantial part of the activities of the
League of Women Voters of Millburn, New Jersey, consisted of attempts to influence legis.
lation and this fact alone disqualified the taxpayer's donation from qualifying as a charitable
contribution.
In Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955), the court based its hold-
ing on the fact that the amount of political activities of the Hamilton County Good Govern.
ment League was not substantial when quantitatively compared with its other activities. Judge
Simon, writing for the court, stated that in his view the word "propaganda" connoted "public
address with selfish or ulterior purpose and characterized by the coloring or distortion of facts."
He thus suggested that he would have reached the same result by using a qualitative standard.
Judge Simon noted, however, that the other two members of the court did not agree with his
qualitative definition of propaganda, and that they interpreted it as meaning any planned or
concerted attempt to influence public opinion.
aGIn Dulles v. Johnson, 273 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1959), rev'g 155 F. Supp. 275 (S.D.N.Y.
1957), the Second Circuit reversed a district court holding that disallowed a deduction for fed.
eral estate tax purposes of bequests to city, county, and state bar associations on the ground
that the bar associations existed primarily to benefit members of the legal profession and to
provide a method to make their views and recommendations on legislation known to legisla.
tors. The Second Circuit found that the association's recommendations concerning impending
legislation were "not such as to cause the forfeiture of charitable status" because they served
no selfish purpose but were an effort to improve the law in technical and non-controversial
areas. "They (were] not intended for the economic aggrandizement ol a partiltdar group
or to promote some larger principle of governmental policy." Id. at 367. In dictum the
Eighth Circuit in St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. United States, 374 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. 1967),
said that a bar association's efforts to improve the law and the administration of justice through
research, investigation, drafting, recommendation and endorsement of various reforms consti.
tuted "public, not private, betterment" and was not "propaganda or disqualifying legislative
activity." Id. at 436.
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Ill. APPLYING THE UNcONsTrTUTIONAL CoNrrioNs
DOCTRINE3 7 TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
A. Origins of the Doctrine
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine has been used to circumvent the prop-
osition that when the state can withhold a privilege or a benefit from an individual
altogether, it also has the power to impose conditions upon the granting of the
benefit. This proposition was articulated by Justice Holmes in McAttliffe it.
Mayor of New Bedford3 8 in which a policeman was removed from office for
violating a regulation prohibiting policemen from soliciting money for political
purposes. Justice Holmes tersely dismissed the policeman's argument that such
a regulation violated his right to express his political opinions noting that "[tQhe
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitu-
tional right to be a policeman."39 He reasoned that since public employment
was nothing but a privilege or a benefit which the state could withhold altogether,
the state was also entitled to offer this privilege on condition.40
This flaw in Holmes' reasoning is found in his apparent presumption that
the power to grant a benefit upon a condition is logically inferable from the
power to withhold the benefit absolutely. He assumes that the limited power
to grant the conditioned benefit is part of the greater power to withhold the
benefit completely. However, the power to impose conditions upon the grant
of a benefit is a different power from the power to deny a benefit, not a lesser
power drived from it.41
Doyle v. Continental Insurance Co.42 illustrates the kind of problems caused
by the right-privilege distinction. In that case the Supreme Court allowed the
state of Wisconsin, pursuant to a state statute, to revoke the license of a foreign
corporation to do business in the state for removing a case to federal court.
The Court said that a state may give a foreign corporation the option of ceasing
to do business in the state or abstaining from the federal courts because the
state may at any time disallo~v the corporation from doing business within its
borders altogether. The dissent' 3 argued that the majority's position was analo-
gous to saying that because a landlord may refuse without cause to receive a
37 See generally French, Comment: Unconstitutional Conditions: An Analysis, 50 GEO. L
J. 234 (1961); Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 CoLUM. L
REV. 321 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Hale]; O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditios: lVel-
fare Benefits With Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L REv. 443 (1966); Note, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 73 HARV. L REV. 1595 (1960); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L REV. 1439 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Van
AIstyne].
38 155 Mass. 216,29 N.E. 517 (1892).
39 Id. at 220,29 N.E. at 517.
40 Holmes wed similar reasoning three years later in Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass.
510, 39 N.E. 113 (1895), aff'd, 167 U.S. 43 (1897), to uphold the conviction of a preacher
for presenting a public address on the Boston Commons in violation of a municipal ordinance
prohibiting public address without a permit from the mayor.
41 See Powell, The Right to Work for the State, 16 CoLUM. L REV. 99, 110-11 (1916).
4294 U.S. 535 (1877).
43 Justice Bradley authored the dissent and Justices Swayne and Miller concurred.
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man as his tenant, he may also condition the tenancy on the applicant's murdering
or robbing another.44
Attempts to articulate the doctrine underlying the unconstitutional conditions
cases are difficult because of the inconsistency of the decisions and the changing
focus of the Court. During the 1930's when the Court was concerned about
preserving the values underlyirig the system of federalism, the focus was on the
purpose underlying the condition. Recently, because of the Court's increased con-
cern for the rights of individuals, the focus has been on whether the condition
infringed upon an express constitutional right. It is this application which has
had increasing appeal to commentators as a basis for holding § 501 (c) (3) un-
constitutional. Christian Echoes provides a vehicle for examining this doctrine as
it would apply to the Internal Revenue Code.
B. Application of the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine in the 1930'i:
Focus on the Federalism Value
In the 1930's the Court was concerned with preserving the federalism value
by insuring that federal regulations did not infringe upon powers reserved
to the states. Thus, in United States v. Butler'5 the Court struck down the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 because it attempted to infringe on powers
reserved to the states by regulating agriculture through the use of federal funds.
In his dissent, Justice Stone4 argued that the power to spend for the general
welfare was authorized and that the conditions attached to the payments were
germane to the purpose of spending for the farmer's welfare:
It is a contradiction in terms to say that there is power to spend for the
national welfare, while rejecting any power to impose conditions reason-
ably adapted to the attainment of the end which alone would justify the
expenditure. ... If the expenditure is for a national public purpose, that
purpose will not be thwarted because payment is on condition which will
advance that purpose. 47
In another case 48 sustaining a federal tax on the payroll of employers under
Title IX of the Social Security Act, which provided for a 90% credit for contri-
butions paid under state unemployment compensation laws, Justice Cardozo said:
We do not say that a tax is valid, when imposed by act of Congress, if it
is laid upon the condition that a state may escape its operation through
the adoption of a statute unrelated in subject matter to activities fairly
within the scope of national policy and power. . . . It is one thing to
impose a tax dependent upon the conduct of the taxpayers, or of the
state in which they live, where the conduct to be stimulated or discour-
aged is unrelated to the fiscal need subserved by the tax in its normal
operation, or any other end legitimately national. .. . It is quite another
thing to say that a tax will be abated upon the doing of an act that will
44 Doyle was overruled in Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922). The court
said that conditions attempting to curtail the constitutional right of citizens of one state to
resort to federal courts in another are void.
45297 U.S. 1 (1936).
46 justices Brandeis and Cardozo concurred in the dissent.
47 297 U.S. at 85-86.
48 Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
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satisfy the fiscal need, the tax and the alternative being approximate
equivalents. 49
Professor Hale, writing in 1935, said that despite the broad language the
Supreme Court has used in describing the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,50
the exercise of a governmental power is not necessarily unconstitutional just be-
cause its purpose is to induce the waiver of constitutional rights. Rather, the
validity of a state's exercise of power depends upon the purposes for which
it is exercised and a power may be valid when exercised for certain purposes
and invalid when exercised for others.5' Thus when the condition imposed on
an individual is germane to a purpose for which the exercise of the state's particu-
lar power can ordinarily be exerted, then the condition may require the waiver
of the individual's constitutional rights.
C. Recent Applications of the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine:
Focus on Infringement of Express Constitutional Rights
The cases arising since the 1930's that have involved the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine have dealt primarily with conditions requiring the surrender
of constitutional rights attached to governmental privileges. For example, in
Sherbert v. Verner5" the Court held that a state may not disqualify an applicant
for unemployment compensation benefits because of her refusal to accept Saturday
employment against her religious beliefs. Speaking for the court, Justice Brennan
said:
Nor may . . . the statute be saved from constitutional infirmity on the
ground that unemployment compensation benefits are not appellant's
"right" but merely a "privilege." It is too late in the day to doubt that
the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of
or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.53
When the enjoyment of a government-connected interest is conditioned upon
the individual's abstention from the exercise of a right protected by an express
clause in the Constitution, the condition will be declared per se unreasonable
if it can be shown to prohibit or abridge the individual's exercise of that right.t"
Professor Van Alstyne finds this doctrine judicially attractive because it not only
preserves the appearance of judicial objectivity by not requiring balancing tests,
but also expedites decision-making by allowing the court to resolve a single ques-
tion, whether or not the regulation conditioned the individual's privilege upon
his waiver of an express constitutional right.55
This attractive simplicity may, however, illustrate the flaw in the doctrine:
the doctrine assumes "the same evil results from attaching certain conditions to
government-connected activity as from imposing such conditions on persons not
-491d at 590-91.
50 Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926).
51 Hale, supra note 37, at 322.
52374 U.S. 398 (1963).
53 Id. at 404-05.
54 Van Alstyne, supra note 37, at 1446.
5Id. at 1446-48.
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connected with the government."50 The connection with the government may
make otherwise unreasonable conditions reasonable in certain circumstances. Be-
cause the unconstitutional conditions doctrine attaches no significance to status
in the public sector, it may be too simplistic and inflexible to deal with such
problems.5 7
It has been suggested that under Van Alstyne's view of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine,'§ 501(c) (3) is unconstitutional, 8 since it conditions the priv-
ilege of tax exemption on the waiver of protected first amendment rights of
freedom of speech.- 9 By denying an exemption under § 501 (c) (3) to organiza-
tions engaging in speech designed to influence the political system, Congress has
effectively penalized these organizations for such speech.30t The expansive defini-
tion of activity which "attempts to influence legislation" in Christian Echoes condi-
tions a governmental privilege on the waiver of the right to expression of political
views which are designed to influence other individuals as well as the legislature,
and appears to be a clear violation of Van Alstyne's view of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. But by comparing its decision upholding the constitutionality
of § 501 (c) (3) to the decision in the Hatch Act case,6t the Tenth Circuit im-
plicitly suggested that either the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is more com-
plex than Van Alstyne understands it to be or the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine has limited applicability within the Internal Revenue Code.
56Id. at 1448.
57 For example, under Van Alstyne's view of the doctrine the decision in United Pub,
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), which upheld the constitutionality of the Hatch Act
was incorrect. Yet the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601 (1973), and United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Asin. of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548 (1973), which reaffirm the constitutionality of the Hatch Act and the state's power
to regulate the political activity of its emp!oyees, suggest that (1) either the doctrine has lim-
ited applicability in certain circumstances which as public employment or (2) the doctrine as
developed by Van Alstyne is oversimplified. See Van Alstyne, supra note 37, at 1447, 1448
in which Van Alstyne discusses the inflexibility of the doctrine.
58 See Troyer, supra note 22, at 1429, 1450; The Internal Revenue Code's Provisions
Against Legislative Activity on the Part of Tax-Exempt Organizations: A Legitim ate Safeguard
or a Violation of the First Amendment?, 3 N.Y.U. Rsv. oF LAW SOC. CHANGI 159, 175-76
(1973).
59 The central purpose of the first amendment is to protect expression which can influence
the American political system and produce orderly change through self government. It was
"fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people," Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957), and
thus it protects all discussion and communication concerning isues of public concern. Cf.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64 (194); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S.
29 (1971); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. Riv. 245;
Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79
HARV. L. REv. 1 (1965); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on 'The Central Mean.
ing of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191.
0 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958).
01470 F.2d at 857. In United Public W'orkers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) the Court
upheld the validity of the Hatch Act restrictions on the political activities of government em-
ployees against a claim that the statute unconstitutionally conditioned the status of public em-
ployment on the waiver of first amendment constitutional rights.
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IV. DESIRABILITY OF APPLYING THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
CONDITIONS DOCTRINE TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
Applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to § 501(c)(3) would be,
it is submitted, an impossible task without an ideal or correct income tax struc-
ture.62  This may account for the Tenth Circuit's reliance on the Hatch Act
case in Christian Echoes,63 suggesting the limited applicability of the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine within the Internal Revenue Code, although the court
itself did not fully explain its reasons for upholding the constitutionality of §
501(c)(3). Two underlying assumptions of the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine are that a government privilege or government largess exists and that it
is unconstitutionally conditioned on the waiver of express constitutional rights.61
The "privilege" under § 501 (c) (3) has been characterized as a tax exemptionaS;
but it is impossible to characterize income tax provisions as "benefits" without
a model tax structure from which deviations are dearly identifiable.
The difficulty with applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in the
area of income taxation is the absence of concurrence on the definition of the word
"income." No theoretical agreement exists today on either of two definitions
basic to a model income tax structure: (1) what items should be taxed, and
(2) what subjects are appropriate taxable units. Leading tax scholars cannot
agree whether selecting a tax model for such items is possible;06 nor can scholars
who advocate such a model agree on the basic definitions.67 Congress has not
attempted to adopt a model tax structure to guide its tax decision-making. With-
out any basic agreement at the legislative level the courts have no standards
by which to determine whether government largess has been bestowed or a condi-
tion imposed.
Obviously, there is no way for a legislature to tax everything. Even the
greediest legislature must choose the appropriate objects of taxation from the
universe of people, entities, and events over which it has jurisdiction.68 The
term "income tax" is misleading because the name does not delineate the extent
of the tax's reach as, for example, the label "poll tax" G6 depicts the base to
which the tax is to be applied. 70 Provisions excluding children, veterans, and
the handicapped from the poll tax could be accurately characterized as government
benefits or privileges. Since Congress has not provided the courts with a model
tax structure from which deviations can be identified, applying the unconstitutional
62 Bittker, Accounting for Federal 'Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22 NAT'L
TAX J. 244 (1969); Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizihg" the
In:ernal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L J. 51 (1972).
63 Christian Echoes Nat'l Min., Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 857 (10th Cir. 1970).
64 Van Alstyne, supra note 43, at 1446.
65) Troyer, supra note 22, at 1427.
GOB. BITTKER, C. GALVIN, R. MUSGRAVE, J. PECHMAN, A COMPREHENSIVE INCOME
TAX BASE? A DEBATE (1968) [hereinafter DEBATE].
07 Id. at 3-9.
(is Bittker, Churches, Taxes, and the Constitution, 78 YALE LJ. 1285, 1288 (1969).
69 Capitation or poll taxes (poll meaning "head") are taxes of a fixed amount upon all per-
sons resident within a specified territory. Shatiesburg Grocery Co. v. Robertson, 88 So. 4, 5,
126 Miss. 34 (1921); United States v. Texas, 252 F. Supp. 234, 238 (W.D. Tex. 1966).
70 DEBATE, at 67.
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conditions doctrine in the Code would result in arbitrary, disparite decision-mak-
ing'7
For example, a hypothetical model tax structure with which § 501(c)(3)
is in perfect accord can be developed to illustrate that § 501(c)(3) does not
reflect government largess. The model taxes the income of natural persons only;
the income of business organizations, trusts, et cetera, is imputed to their share-
holders, beneficiaries', or other interested natural persons. Under this model the
income of some groups-chambers of commerce, social clubs, labor unions, and
charities engaged in political activity-might be imputed to their members on
the basis that they enjoy the economic benefit of the entity's income. Other
groups like the Red Cross might have beneficiaries too widespread to impute
with the organization's income and still be in accord with the assumed function
of income taxation-collecting revenue from natural persons proportionately to
their economic gain.7 2 Thus determinations of what constitutes a benefit gauged
against the model structure would lead to the conclusion that § 501(c)(3) in-
cludes neither government largess or a condition.
V. CONCLUSION
The current income tax structure is a compendium of many provisions reflect-
ing many debatable judgments. Like all legislative judgments, tax policy decisions
may be unwise and improvident. When they appear unwise to taxpayers and
to courts, however, they should not be eliminated from the Code by applying
a constitutional doctrine based on the premise of a government privilege, since
there are no standards for determining what is and is not a tax privilege. In
Christian Echoes the Tenth Circuit made the only tenable decision when faced
with the problem of whether to apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
to the Internal Revenue Code; constitutional distinctions resting on the supposition
of government largess cannot be based on an undefined concept of the "income
tax."
Karen 1. Mueller
71 It could, of course, be argued that whatever provisions Congress enacts become the
model tax structure per se. If this is true, however, there are still no tax privilegcs since
definitionally the base is composed of only those items Congress chooses to tax.
72 Bittker, Churches, Taxes, and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285, 1289-90 (1969).
Of course, provision may need to be made to deal with associated problems-g., unrelated
business income.
